THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATION – THE MALAYSIAN MANUSCRIPT

Capitalism has become increasingly nomadic, leaving a trail of social-economic disorderliness and disarrangement in its wake. 

The turbulents create Capitalism: crisis to crisis.

CONTENTS


1] INTRODUCTION
2] PETRONAS, PEASANTRY AND THE PROLETARIATS
3] THE DEVELOPMENT  OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT
4] CORPORATE CAPITAL, RENTIER CAPITALISM AND THE CLIENTEL CAPITAL CLASS

5] LABOUR, CLASS AND ALIENATION
6] CIRCUITRY OF CAPITAL
7] ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS

8] MADANI MALAYSIA
9] EARLY MALAYSIAN TRILOGY

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1] INTRODUCTION

Capitalism important trends in recent history:

(1) slowing down of the overall rate of growth;
(2) internationalisation of monopolistic transnational corporations (TNCs); and
(3) emergence of the “capital accumulation process” or financialization capitalism

a) Since the 1974-1975 recession, there is a growth rate slowdown in advanced capitalist economies with impactful economic effects on the poorest countries. Scouting for wider markets to sustain capitalism, a proliferation of corporations – with neoliberalism policies – begins setting up assembly lines across borders in different geographical locations, especially inside developing countries – the Global South – where in 2010, more than half of all foreign direct investment (FDI) went to third world and transition economies. With this strategic positioning in place, and world production dominated by a relatively few transnational corporations (TNC) exercising considerable monopoly power over states and labour, the migration towards the international concentration of capital clearly reflected on the work of Lenin (Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, New York: International Publishers, 1939) and, on the other hand, confirms Amin’s imperialism of generalized-monopoly capitalism and Emmanuel’s unequal exchange under Neo-Imperialism that initiated underdevelopment under monopoly-capitalism through sheer exploitation.

The international concentration of capital invertibly gives birth to international monopoly-finance capital that ensues the emergence of financialization capitalism (see John Bellamy Foster, The Financialization of Accumulation, Monthly Review vol:62, issue 05 October 2010). Financialization capitalism becomes prominent because the TNCs are unable to find sufficient investment outlets for their huge economic surpluses from production, increasingly turn to speculation within the global financial sphere, (see John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, The Great Financial Crisis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009). Even households had become financialized, (see Costas Lapavitsas,  Financialised Capitalism: Crisis and Financial Expropriation, Historical Materialism 17 (2009), School of Oriental and African Studies, London and Costas LapavitsasThe Era of Financialization, Part 3, TripleCrisis). In the country, financialization capitalism is engaging – and entangling – the political economy of Malaysia even during a Covid19 pandemic situation when such capitalism is as contiguous as the virus itself, and became the dominance of financial monopoly-capitalism in the nation, and consequently indebted the country. The urban poors are distressing in debts as reported by UNICEF 2020. The collusion of monopoly-capitalism with clientel capitalism is clearly evident during the acquisition, distribution and Covid19 vaccination processes.

b) Malaysia, within a world economy infused with capitalism, has a neo-colonialism economy past where a particular racial class of succeeding ethnocapital kleptocracy regimes exist in looting national coffers essentially through illicit capital and illegal tradings after her independence from British colonial master, inadvertently perpetuating the consolidation of ethnocapital clientel capitalism.

c) That what is widely referred to as neoliberal globalization in the twenty-first century is in fact a historical shift to global monopoly-finance capital (see Samir Amin imperialism of generalized-monopoly capitalism) taking on a new phase in the globalization of production and finance.

During the 1970s, Malaysia went through an industrialisation initiative though did not employ as many workers as projected, but FDI still created an underdevelopment in monopoly-capitalism environment that inevitably invited these TNCs exploiting precarious labour. Presently, the few TNCs dominating particular industries or in the sectors of electrical and electronic production are confronted with a dialectic of rivalry and collusion: the mobile phone industry and a infrastructural platform, like Google, are prime examples of the control of telecommunication services.

d) There is a “competition” between firms in search for low labour cost (economics term: labour arbitrage) and low-cost production processes (operations management from lean to just-in-time and flexible production),  competition for resources and markets (strategic management term: competitive advantages) and marketing principles on product differentiation (varied products with many features and multi-functionalities at various price structures in different marketspheres).

By 2008, those top one hundred global corporations which had shifted their production to foreign affiliates or subsidiaries accounted worldwide for 60 percent of their total assets and employment, and more than 60 percent of their total sales.

e) During an era of global monopoly-finance capital, financial capital is part of the transnational migration of capital with Information Technology augmenting the monopolisation trends primarily, ( see John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney, The Internet’s Unholy Marriage to Capitalism, Monthly Review 62, no. 10 (March 2011): 1-30). Increasingly, capital accumulation – real capital formation in the realm of goods and services – has become widely subordinate to finance, including the public healthcare and pharmaceutical providers, housings development through Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) and others.

Whereas labour ( owing to a combination of cultural, political, economic, legal and geographical reasons ) is rooted in particular nations – ensuring a constant and growing supply to the global reserve army of workers – capital is globally mobile, thus consolidating the Global Labour Arbitrage advantages with Global Value Chains.

This Capital Internationalisation fragments, and weakens, labour organizations, and during the Covid19 pandemic especially in union bursting regionally, including Malaysia specifically.

2] PETRONAS, PEASANTRY & THE PROLETARIATS

a) In the 1970s so it comes about with the discovery of oil and gas, and in a beachhead, the Big Oil controlled the exploitation along the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia, and on the South China Sea off Sabah and Sarawak. The ensuing Neo-Imperialism penetration tilted an economic development paradigm shift: an intensified economic nationalism – culminating with the Guthrie Dawn Raid – a focused ethnocratic inclination that firmly reconstructed the strengthening stronghold of an ethnocapital hegemony of the ruling class. These factors contribute to consolidation of rentier capitalism as was enmeshed in the New Economic Policy (see Jomo 2004, SME 2019). The associated negative ramifications that surfaced perpetuates a burden of privileges in the economy (see Sadhive) that need to be reviewed and restructured, if not, rejected.

b) Concurrently with the energetic endeavour in O&G exploitation is the promotion of the rural community FELDA scheme that was envisaged to forestall possible Urban-Agrarian collaboration and cooperation for revolutionary changes towards a new peasantry-proletariat political economy in Malaysia. Supposedly to be corridor sanitarian to corral rural Malay communities with modern built-in infrastructure –  with clinics, schools, roads and bridges – ensuring subsistence dependence with loyalty to the ruling class and the transnational corporation presence in the FTZs and EFTZs (Exports Free Trade Zones) to mop-up precarious labour.

What is acclaimed as “accumulation by dispossession,”(see David Harvey, 2019) with the mass global removal of peasants from the land by Big Farm agribusiness and peasant migration to overcrowded cities yet to encounter dialectical urbanism in capitalist enclaves – from FELDA to FGV –  has greatly increased the “reserve” industrial reserve army of labor worldwide, but landless impoverishment culminating in the students’ Baling Hunger Strike.

3] THE DEVELOPMENT  OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

NEP consequential follow through, as stated, is the emergence of clientel capitalism solidified into an ethnocapital hegemony. The subsequent Asian Financial Crisis (AFC1997) and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC2007) tanked the country with a stagnant economy (see Sadhive 2020) – whereby the country is forever mired in debts with profound poverty among rakyat2 and inequality in wealth distribution. To compound the politico-economic landscape is that often we have big budgets, bad debts accompanied by a bad government after the Sheraton Move in 2020, and its aftermath (James Chin 2020; Bridget Welsh 2020).

The country is a case in development of underdevelopment even to her member states so much so that besides stripping the nation’s endowed potentialities under the auspice of GLC’s ownership and control, she also sold out to Big Oil (see also Rob UrieOil Imperialism and Monetary Policy, 25/03/2015, counterpunch); the accompanying intra-state political intrigues and deft maneuverings (see James Chin 2020, 2018, 2016; MA63) have yet to subside.

4] CORPORATE CAPITAL , RENTIER CAPITALISM AND THE CLIENTEL CAPITAL CLASS

The political economy of the country thus rests upon an agenda of neoliberalism favouring corporate capital colluding with clientel capitalism locally to connect with Global North monopoly-capital, besides getting entangled under a  Ecological-Epidemiological-Economic crisis during a covid19 pandemic.

Linking the conduit of monopoly-capital connections, whether as in Apple Corp. case or HERE, and locally like the Top Grove, is that where financialization capitalism is playing a big role in gourging the financial domain than promoting productivity, research and development breakthroughs nor wider market coverage as under industrialisation.

The implementation of the enthnocratically-administrated National Economic Policy in 1970, (see, selectively: Navaratnam 2020, Zainuddin 2019, Jomo 2005,) where succeeding oligarchy regimes had continued maintaining a clientel ethnocapitalism domination over the working class rakyat2 with 1% of the bumiputera population (see Khalid lse.blog) or about 40,000 ethnocapital political families running and looting – and ruining – the national economy in alliance with Global North monopoly-capital – all in furtherance of neo-imperialism penetration that by now the ownership of a failed state, (see Aliran 2021).

An ethnocratic governance is where representatives of an ethnic group is holding a disproportionately large number of public posts to advance their ethnic group to the disfranchisement of others, (see Winter, J.A., Oligarchy, Cambridge University Press, 2011 and Wade, G., The Origins and Evolution of Ethnocracy in Malaysia, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, Working Paper Series 112, April 2009), including enforcng political Islam.

With entrenched political power wielding authority over or directing the behavior of rakyat2, whether in economic, social lives or cultural, the accumulation of capital to the ruling class continues expanding. The political economy of Malaysia needs to be analysed on a class basis because it entails producing, expropriating, and distributing surplus value of rakyat2 labourby rent seekers in collusion with monopoly-capital.

Under capitalism, the capitalists are dominant at each level of society, the proletarians are dominated at each and every sector of labouring activities. Where class existing at each economic, political, and ideological (or cultural) level, the class relationship to where dominating power ensues could be identified from the  stronghold of clientelism and the ensuring political clientel relationship where ruling elites in, say United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) [place] had aligned with economic oligarchs [positions] in accepting rentier capitalism to sustain their hold on [power]. They adopt this clientelism as solicitations for votes at the grassroots level, allowing division-level ruling elites [place] the party patronage [position] and political [power] to effectively partisanizing them and ensuring ground-level officials with whom most voters interacted with are political party loyalists, (see Weiss 2020 and newmandala). The entrenched class even tried to own and control the banking sector just as government linked companies (GLCs) have administrative controls over various land distribution to landless cultivators. GLCs also have their hands full in many financial sectors including the Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) which is the investment arm of the Bumiputra Investment Foundation (YPB) under financialization capitalism :

The web of the Prime Minister Office that is linked to the Prime Minister Economics Affair controlling government corporations, registered companies, trust and saving funds, cooperatives, state authorities, research and development departments

5] LABOUR, CLASS AND ALIENATION

a) The political economy environment encourages local corporate capital colluding with external monopoly-capital towards continuous extracting surplus value from the labouring class. Through the application of global labour arbitrage where, as a result of the removal of or through the disintegration of barriers to international trade, jobs and industries have since moved to nations where labour and the cost of doing business is through workers’ low-pay and where operational costs are inexpensive, respectively, thus creating a rentier capitalism class to enlarge upon capital accumulation by the TNCs.

b) With the introduction of computerisation in the country during 1980s, and the inauguration of the Multimedia Supercorridor in Cyberjaya – more wide spread when the economy engages in e-commerce at the beginning of the twenty-first century – Workers in the digital-economy and zero-hour workers often found themselves underemployed, and alienated whether as the reserve army of labour looking for jobs or searching for unaffordable housing or as unsettling owners on Felda Venture Global’s FELDA plantations.

c) Now with the introduction of a system in infrastructural platform, likely it shall indeed expand and likely prolong the unemployment problems in the country because present education system has not engender nor energise an IT ecosystem to support such high-technology system where the main gainers are the digital lords and digital knights like Telekom’s TM as a monopoly GLC-clientel gainer just as in the pharmaceutical  industry the privatised pharmaceutical firm Pharmanagia profited well during the Covid19 pandemic. In the public hospitals, owing to the compradore capitalists greeds and the adoption of a financialization capitalism model, there is an unequal access and inequity healthcare services throughout the country- whether in Sabah or Sarawak. There should be a national initiative towards equity and equality access to healthcare provision, more urgently now with the rollout of Covid19 vaccines, the distribution process could be disrupted by the challenges in the monopoly supply chain, (see codeblue, bridgetwelsh, aliran 2019; see also Jomo on vaccine nationalism and vaccine apartheid).

6] CIRCUITRY OF CAPITAL

a) The chaining to the neo-colonialism economic architecture linking to extractive value chain benefitting Global North monopoly capitalism that encourages penetration of neo-imperialism with financialization capitalism which has gourged national resources is the circuitry of capitalism that indebted national sovereign wealth.

b) The circuitry of capital that tied to Global North monopoly-capitalism by commodity chaining in the acquiring, production and distribution of raw materials into as finished commodities to be channelled to various external marketspace has not endowed, despite urged to aim high by World Bank, the national economy towards wealth creation for rakyat2 but solidify in the country clientel capitalism. In partucular, present ruling regimes are adopting clientel-capitalism to colonialise the minds of the unrepresented destitutes in order to retain and sustain political power yet without much spread effect to be equally shared.

Indeed, the top 1% own 45% of all global personal wealth; 10% own 82%; whereas the bottom 50% own less than 1% according to Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report on the household wealth of 5.2 billion people across the world.

c) In a globalised world, activities are involved in the production of goods and services and later their supply, distribution, and post-sales activities are coordinated across geographical destinations; there are values in these activities because capital follows these processes during circuitry. Global Value Chain (GVC) has generated much inequalities that is dissonance with poverty’s poors with approaches of unequal exchange. Most unfortunately, the GVC world also enhances the dominance of transnational corporations (TNCs), concentrates wealth, represses the incomes of supplier firms in developing countries, and creates many bad jobs (degrading, dirty, dangerous) that demand foreign labour intake with deleterious outcomes for local workers, but if they do protest on working conditions whether through go-slow or collective strikes, union busting by TNCs becomes the directive norms.

7] ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS

a) Since the accumulation of capital is paramount to the owners of capital, their prime objective is to obtain their returns of investment within a short period so they can accumulate profits faster. As a result, investors do not consider long term impacts of their actions on the environment nor Mother Earth’s biosphere, (see Ian Angus, Earth Science and Ecological Marxism)

b) Marx’s central concepts of the “universal metabolism of nature,” “social metabolism,” and the metabolic “rift” to define the ecological worldview, (Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 3, London: Penguin, 1981), 949; Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 30, 54–66) means that an understanding of ecological economics and ecosocialism development for nation is a necessity towards attaining ecologically Engels.

c) The deforestation of Borneo rich hinterlands with the construction of the Pan Borneo Highway, the radioactive contamination by rare earth Lynas, the suphuric discharge in Mamut copper mine and cyanidation of Raub Australian Gold Mine bear testimonials that human must bear ecosocialism responsibility to our planetary well-being to Mother Earth.

8] MADANI Malaysia

Post-GE15, there is a serial of articles on MADANI economy Malaysia covering The Script on capital accumulation and labour exploitation relations besides other economic elements in The Naratives and critical observations therein with The Conversation. The main components in a Madani Malaysia economic development are covered by various aspects like the vision of a democratic islamic view on politico-economic development as well as the parameters require to execute the endeavour: financial requirements and means to secure them; the approaches including the Targeted Area in Poverty Alleviation Objectives (TAPAO), and the method to implement the PRAXIS, those identifiable constraining factors in deliverance from neoliberal policies as advocated by the World Bank/IMF to the inefficiency in the class-stratified public sector besides the limitations in fiscal tools to minimise debts and will power to restructure the government-link companies and their ensuing odious practices.

The geoeconomic challenges of a Madani economy Malaysia is amplified whilst an alternative community-based organisation based on socialism with a Malaysian characteristic is proposed.

9] Other than the inherent weaknesses of capitalism are examined, the alternative economic model in socialism practice is proposed using US-CHINA case studies in an Incremental Capital Output Ratio analysis.

10] EARLY MALAYSIAN TRILOGY

Acknowledging that human evolution helps us to understand the biological and cultural expressions of these First People, with far-reaching implications for Man’s shared welfare, there is a need on the extension, and explanation, of a Malaysian consciousness towards a national identity, and firming the nation-bonding.

Part I: The Early Malaysians

The oldest evidence of early human habitation in Malaysia was discovered in 2008 when stone hand-axes were unearthed in the historical site of Lenggong dating back 1.83 million years. Also in Malaysia, the earliest discovery of a 40,000-year human skull was found in the Niah Caves of Sarawak, besides new archaeological discoveries in the Lembah Bujang area in Sungei Petani. 

Therefore, only by being conscious about the role of various communities – with different ethnic, race and creed –  that defines our Malaysian nation can help to challenge power holders who had distorted and reconstructed history based on self ethnocapital class interests by seducing society according to ethnicity, race and religion, (see Lim Teck Ghee 2021, Cheah Boon Kheng 1996).

EPILOGUE

One possible solution to these crises of capitalism, and that is, the demise of capitalism itself.

GLOSSARY TERMS

1mdb Malaysia sovereign fund heisted 

AI Anwar Ibrahim; artificial intelligence

agency house British entity acting as an intermediary to merchants or cohort of traders in colonial England

alienation the process whereby the worker is made to feel foreign to the products of his/her own labour or the process of labour and a self consciousness on self-estrangement during the labouring effort

B40 represents the bottom 40% of income Malaysia

black swan an unpredictable or unforeseen event, typically one with extreme consequences

bourgeoisie rose at the end of the eighteenth century, and (in Marxist contexts) the capitalist class who own most of society’s wealth and means of production

bumiputra (Jawi: بوميڤوترا) is a term used in Malaysia to describe Malays and Orang Asli or indigenous peoples of Malaysia or Southeast Asia; officially, it recognised the “special position” of the Malays provided in the Constitution of Malaysia, in particular Article 153

capital wealth in the form of money or other assets owned by a person or organization to further generate higher rates of return to the initial capital outlay thereby creating capital accumulation https://youtu.be/DwyYzewiGh8

capital accumulation is an increase in assets from investments or profits and is one of the building blocks of a capitalist economy (capitalism) where the goal is to increase the value of an initial investment as a return on investment, whether that be through appreciation, rent, capital gains, or interest (that could also be part of financialization  capitalism)

capitalism an economic and political system in which a country’s trade and industry are controlled by private owners for profit, rather than by the state

capitalist class the group of people who own the means of production and employ workers

class where the ruling class (bourgeoisie) who own the means of production and the working class (proletariat) who are exploited

class struggle where in any society there is tension or antagonism that requires such conflict to be resolved

clientel capitalism is rent-seeking capital in the monopolization of access to any kind of property (physical, financial, intellectual, etc.) to gain significant amounts of returns without any contribution to society

compradore capitalist an entrepreneur in colonial or THIRD WORLD countries who accumulates capital through acting as intermediary between indigenous producers and foreign merchants

coronavirus capitalism is a particular type of Malaysian corporate capitalism infecting and destabilising the national economy through cronyism and/or ethnocratic empowerment; can transmit transnationally across the South China Sea to the states of Sarawak and Sabah

cronyism the appointment of friends and associates to positions of authority, without proper regard to their qualifications

dawn raid the returning and retaining of British agency houses assets and resources to Malaysia; see Guthrie Dawn Raid

digital labour e-commerce workers

digital transactions seamless system involving one or more participants, where such transactions are effected without the need for cash

economic nationalism favors state interventionism over other market mechanisms, with policies such as domestic control of the national economy, labor, and capital formation

ethnocracy political structure in which the state apparatus is controlled by a dominant ethnic group (or groups) to further its interests, power and resources

ethnocapital where bumiputera is advancing the Malay community with capital to the disfranchisement of others

epidemiological relating to the branch of medicine which deals with the incidence, distribution, and control of diseases

FELDA the Federal Land Development Authority – a Malaysian government agency to handle the resettlement of rural poor and smallholders into newly developed areas to plant, grow and harvest cash crops like palm oil and rubber

FGV Felda Global Venture is the global, diversified and sustainable integrated agri-business corporatized from FELDA settlers’ schemes

FTZ free trade zone: a geographic area where goods are imported, stored, handled, manufactured, or reconfigured and re-exported without subjecting to customs duty

financialization development of financial capitalism during the 1980s to present, in which debt-to-equity ratios increased and financial services (derivatives. hire-purchases, insurance, leasings, rents, digital transactions and interests) accounted for an increasing share of national income relative to other sectors

fiscal stimulus (packages) a government cuts taxes or increases its spending or just gives out any money in a bid to revive the economy and placate rakyat

glc government-link companies

globalization the process by which businesses or other organizations develop international influence or start operating on an international scale

global capital is the interlinking of various investment exchanges around the world that enable individuals and entities to buy and sell financial securities and digital transactions at international level

global labor arbitrage is an economic phenomenon where, as a result of the removal of or disintegration of barriers to international trade, jobs move to nations where labor and the cost of doing business is inexpensive and/or impoverished labor moves to nations with higher paying jobs.

global north refers to those developed societies of Europe and north America with dominance of world trade and politics

global south identifying countries with one side of the underlying global North–South divide, the other side being the countries of the Global North; underdeveloped and developing countries which are not part of global north

global oligopolistic capitalism, in which finance capital has come to dominate worldwide production and distribution

global value chain in a globalised world, activities are involved in the production of goods and services and later their supply, distribution, and post-sales activities are coordinated across geographical destinations; there are values in these chained activities that are not accrued to labour in the producing countries

kleptocracy a government whose corrupt leaders (kleptocrats) use political power to appropriate the wealth of their nation, typically by embezzling or misappropriating government funds

labouring class comprises those engaged in waged or salaried labour, especially in manual-labour occupations and industrial work

landless untitled cultivators and farmers, indebted FELDA settlers and unsettled natives in Sarawak and Sabah 

M40 representing the middle 40% of income earners in Malaysia

malay dilemma is the particular question on the dilemmas of many a malay not understanding what are the problems of the malay community that has to be examined and analysed by a Dr. Mohammed Mahathir

means of production also termed as capital good, are physical and non-financial inputs used in the production of goods and services with economic value

monopoly capital greater centralization and concentration of capital by conglomerate of businesses along with the financial domination of industry

neoliberalism market-oriented reform policies through eliminating price controls, deregulating capital markets, lowering trade barriers besides reducing state influence with privatisation in the economy

nep new economic policy initiated in 1970 sought to ‘eradicate poverty’ and ‘restructure society to eliminate the identification of race with economic function’ in order to create the conditions for national unity

ngo non-government organisations

neo-colonialism use of economic, political, cultural, or other pressures to control or influence other countries, especially former dependencies https://wordpress.com/read/blogs/58770018/posts/264

neo-imperialism using cultural, commercial and/or political power and influence to dominate smaller countries. Neoimperialism is the specific contemporary phase of historical development that features the economic globalization and financialization of monopoly capitalism.

neo-liberalism economics market-oriented reform policies such as “eliminating price controls, deregulating capital markets, lowering trade barriers” and reducing state influence in the economy, especially through privatization and austerity.

oligarchic alliance an international monopoly alliance of oligarchic capitalism, featuring one hegemonic ruler and several other great powers, has come into being and provides the economic foundation for the money politics, vulgar culture, and military threats that exploit and oppress on the basis of the monopoly

pandemic an epidemic of an infectious disease that has spread across a large region, for instance multiple continents or worldwide often as a result of global capital  that drove the deforestation for economic activities exposing emergence of new pathogens

political islam the ideology of Ketuanan Melayu Islam (Malay Islam Supremacy)  

precarious labour to describe non-standard or temporary employment that may be poorly paid, insecure, unprotected, and unable to support a household 

privatisation the transfer of businesses, industries or services from public ownership and or control to private ownership and control.

rakyat folks or ordinary people of Malaysia

rentier capitalism monopolization of access to any kind of property (physical, financial, intellectual, etc.) and gaining significant amounts of profit without contribution to society

rukunegara https://wordpress.com/read/feeds/15271425/posts/2891028545

socialism where there is no ownership nor private-property income, but when labour work for a share of firm’s profits or collect a share of dividends from society’s wealth which is equally shared

supply chain is a network between a company and its suppliers to produce and distribute a specific product or service. The entities in the supply chains include producers, vendors, warehouses, transportation companies, distribution centers, and retailers

surplus value the excess of value produced by the labour of workers over the wages they are paid

T20 represents the top 20% of income earners in Malaysia

tasik utara student movements’ campaign for eradication of rakyat rural poverty 

third world countries included nations in Asia and Africa that were not aligned with either the United States or the Soviet Union

transnational an entity going beyond national boundaries or interests; often, the term MNC multinational corporation is used where it is a large organisation incorporated in one country that produces or sells goods or services in various countries. The two main characteristics of MNCs are their large size and the fact that their worldwide activities are centrally controlled by the parent companies

value chain is formed of primary activities that add value to the final product directly and support activities that add value indirectly

zero hour type of employment contract between an employer and worker whereby the employer is not obliged to provide any minimum number of working hours to the employee

Standard

BREAKING THE GLASS SCREEN – FRAMING MONOPOLY CAPITALISM IN GLOBAL COMMODITY CHAINS

PROLOGUE

In 2007 – a digital time not spatially long ago – a month before the iPhone was production scheduled, the late Steven Jobs took some of his staff to an office. He had been carrying a prototype of the device in his pocket daily for weeks.

Mr. Jobs angrily held up his iPhone so that everyone could see the dozens of tiny scratches marring its plastic screen. He then pulled his keys from his jeans.

People will carry this phone in their pocket, he was quoted to say.
“I won’t sell a product that gets scratched,” he said tensely.

The only solution was to use unscratchable glass instead.

“I want a glass screen, and I want it perfect in six weeks.”

(Duhigg, C and Bradsher, K. “How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work“, The New York Times, published January 21st., 2012).

1] INTRODUCTION

An executive left that meeting and booked a flight to Shenzhen, China. If Mr. Jobs wanted a perfection, there was nowhere else to go.

Malik, Y, Niemeyer, A. and Ruwadi,B. “Building the supply chain of the future“, McKinsey Quarterly, January 2011; see also, Aminpour, S. and Woetzel, “Applying lean manufacturing in China” , The McKinsey Quarterly, 2006 Special Edition, pp. 106-115). To compare the underlying leadership philosophy in operations management, see Kim, M.(2012), “Samsung’s crisis culture: a driver and a drawback”, Sep. 2, 2012 (Reuters).

It was often argued that such material production like the glass panels could make in the USA, and then ship it by boat, but that would take 35 days. “Or, we could ship it by air, but that’s 10 times as expensive. So we build our glass factories next door to assembly factories, and those are overseas.”  Wingfield, N and Duhigg, C. “Apple Lists Its Suppliers for 1st Time”, The New York Times, published January 13th, 2012).

The transnational corporation (TNC) is the product of concentration and centralization of capital that created monopoly capital where the accumulation of capital has always meant expansion.

Furthermore, this present process of growing and spreading is global in scale and, most importantly, economic imperialistic in its characteristics. It has an intensed transformative quality of organization and dominance of monopoly capital based on the rampage of peripheral countries’ natural resources. It has also the gained comparative advantages from global labor arbitrage, that is, the significant wage differentials between various countries and regions, in this global chain of  business activities, (Suwandi and Foster, 2016, Global Commodity Chains and the New Imperialism).

Through these global commodity chains, monopoly-capital signals the determination and structuring of production worldwide on different commodities and subcomponent parts. With flexibility in a lean production, linked in global commodity chains, various and varied assembly plants are located in different geographical locations in the Global South. These are the sites where the reserve army of labor is larger, unit labor costs are lower, and rates of exploitation are correspondingly higher. The result is much higher profit margins for the transnational corporations leading to the amassing of wealth in the Global North centre, via a kind “profit by expropriation”.

2] GLOBAL COMMODITY CHAINS

The term global commodity chain referred to the material and logistical aspects of organizing production involving numerous components brought together over spatially dispersed global production platforms and or assembly sites.

With a global footprint, iPhone manufacturers stakes to a global supply chain. Apple contracts with major carriers including FedEx and UPS to ship iPhones around the world. One Boeing 747 flight can carry 150,000 iPhones.

For phones bound for the U.S., flights depart from Zhengzhou, China, and head to Anchorage, Alaska, where the jets are refuelled. Then, these flights are mostly routed to Louisville, Kentucky, where logistics personnel sort and reroute the iPhones to their final destinations.

Terence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein advanced the commodity chain concept in the 1980s as part of the world-systems perspective – with an emphasis on the “historical reconstruction of industries during the long sixteenth century.” (Terence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, “Commodity Chains in the World Economy Prior to 1800,” Review 10, no. 1 (1986): 157–70). The global commodity-chain framework was further popularized in the mid–1990s, marked by the publication of Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism edited by Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz. Later, Gereffi also became a prominent figure in the forming of the global value-chain/global supply-chain research network in 2000.

Economic researchers at the Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales in France indicate that global commodity chains have three different elements: (1) a production element linking parts and commodities in complex production chains; (2) a value element, which focuses on their role as “value chains,” transferring value between and within firms globally; and (3) a monopoly element, reflecting the fact that such commodity chains are controlled by the centralized financial headquarters of monopolistic multinational corporations and garner massive monopoly rents, as theorized by Stephen Hymer in the 1970s, (Stephen Hymer, The Multinational Corporation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

The common distinction between global supply chains and global value chains is mainly between what Karl Marx called the material or “natural form” of the commodity, “use value” as opposed to its “value form,” or exchange value. All of this, however, needs to be united within a general theory of global commodity production, (Karl Marx, “The Value-Form,” Capital and Class 2, no. 1 (1978): 134).

According to one recent pioneering study of global financial flows by the Centre for Applied Economics of the Norwegian School of Economics and the United States-based Global Financial Integrity, net resource transfers from developing and emerging economies to rich countries were estimated at $2 trillion in 2012 alone, (Centre for Applied Research, Financial Flows and Tax Havens, Norwegian School of Economics and Global Financial Integrity, Bergen, Norway 2015).

The component manufacturers create the memory chips, glass screen interfaces, casings, cameras, and everything in between. A former executive had described how the Apple company depended upon a Chinese factory to revamp the iPhone manufacturing just weeks before the device was due to be marketed. Apple had redesigned the iPhone’s screen at the last minute thereby enforcing an assembly line overhaul. New screens began arriving at the plant close to midnight.

A) The Labour

A foreman immediately roused 8,000 workers inside the company’s dormitories, according to the executive. Each employee was given a biscuit and a cup of tea, guided to a workstation and within half an hour started a 12-hour shift fitting glass screens into beveled frames. Within 96 hours, the plant was producing over 10,000 iPhones a day.

The question is not just about how the transnationals control the commodity chains, but also how they facilitate the extraction of surplus from the Global South. The underlying concept of the global labor arbitrage, famously defined by Stephen Roach, the former chief economist of Morgan Stanley, as the replacement of high-wage workers in the United States and other rich economies “with like-quality, low-wage workers abroad.”  The global labor arbitrage is often rationalized as “an urgent survival tactic” for Global North companies to cut costs and to “search for new efficiencies”, (Stephen Roach, “How Global Labor Arbitrage Will Shape the World Economy”, Global Agenda Magazine, 2004).

In the context of the Marxian labour theory of value, the global labor arbitrage is quest for valorization. It is a strategy for both reducing socially necessary labor costs and maximizing the appropriation of surplus value. It extracts more out of workers through various means, including repressive work environments in periphery-economy factories, state-enforced bans on unionization or union-busting by the TNCs themselves, and quota systems or by means of unfair piece-rate work payments, (see Mhinder Bhopal, US Union Busting in Contemporary Malaysia: 1970-2000, University of North London; and STORM, Zero Hour Underemployment – Surplus Value Exploitation).

The global labor arbitrage is a factual existence because the industrial reserve army of the unemployed which on a global scale, this is the a global reserve army of labour.  Central to the creation of this reserve army is the depeasantization of a large portion of the global periphery through the spread of agribusiness, like our FELDA schemes. The resettlement of rural communities had indebted the peasantry contributing a movement from the  rural areas to the growth of urban poverty. Marx connected the “freeing” of peasants (the “latent” part of the reserve army) from the land to the process of “so-called primitive accumulation.” (Intan Suwandi, R. Jamil Jonna and John Bellamy Foster, Global Commodity Chains and the New Imperialism, Monthly Review, March 01 2019).

Reproducing the global reserve army of labor not only serves to increase shorter-term profits; it serves as a divide-and-rule approach to labour on a global scale in the interest of long-term accumulation by transnationals corporations and with the collaboration of state apparatus like GLCs aligned with them. The consequent competition among industrial workers in the Global South is greatly intensified by increasing the relative surplus population. This divide-and-rule strategy serves to integrate “disparate labour surpluses, ensuring a constant and growing supply of recruits to the global reserve army” who are “made less recalcitrant by insecure employment and the continual threat of unemployment.” (Intan Suwandi, Behind the Veil of Globalization, Monthly Review, July 01, 2015).

B) The Process

The focus on Asia “came down to two things,” said one former high-ranking Apple executive. Factories in Asia “can scale up and down faster” and “Asian supply chains have surpassed what’s in the U.S.”, (Bruce Constantine, Brian D. Ruwadi, and Joshua Wine article on “Management practices that drive supply chain success“, McKinsey Quarterly, February 2009).

The speed and flexibility is breathtaking,” the executive said. “There’s no American plant that can match that.” (to compare this statement with Stefan Knupfer and Glenn Mercer article on Can US auto suppliers stay ahead of Chinese rivals?, McKinsey Quarterly, September 2005).

When an Apple team eventually visited its new site, the Chinese plant’s owners were already constructing a new wing. “This is in case you give us the contract,” the manager said, according to a former Apple executive. The Chinese government had agreed to underwrite costs for numerous industries, and those subsidies had trickled down to the glass-cutting factory. It had a warehouse filled with glass samples available to Apple, free of charge. The owners made engineers available at almost no cost. They had built on-site dormitories so employees would be available 24 hours a day.

“The entire supply chain is in China now,” said another former high-ranking Apple executive. “You need a thousand rubber gaskets? That’s the factory next door. You need a million screws? That factory is a block away. You need that screw made a little bit different? It will take three hours.”

The dynamic change in the electronic and electrical supply chain is also a reflection on innovative technologies that enable, and enhance, the digital production, and the enhancement of a digital economy. Look at the pre-iTune environment and the cutting off sub-contracting intermediaries in subsequent operational management:

Processes of traditional record making

The conventional mode in the production of a music record is transformed whereby the intermediary subcontracting from arranging an orchestra to the recording of a music to production of the vinyl record is controlled, and monopolized, by a dominant entity through a change in the operational mode of the new supply chain:

Business model changes : multiplayers to 3 entities

Under this new way of doing business, monopoly capitalism has evolved, but the mode of capital accumulation persists; the exploitation of labour remains. In Marxian economics, the rate of exploitation is the ratio of the total amount of unpaid labor done (surplus-value) to the total amount of wages paid (the value of labour power). The rate of exploitation is known as the rate of surplus-value.

Workers under capitalism are compelled by their lack of ownership of the means of production to sell their labor power to capitalists for less than the full value of the goods they produce. Capitalists, in turn, need not produce anything themselves but are able to live instead off the productive energies of each and every worker effort.

C] The Capital

Foxconn, the world’s largest Apple subcontractor, once had more than 200,000 workers in one facility in Longhua, a factory district of Shenzhen in south China also known as “iPod City” (Webster, Nick. 2006, “Welcome to iPod City: The ‘Robot’ Workers on 15-hour Days”). In a few years, the Longhua factory grew to about a 400,000 population and the total number of Foxconn employees in China exceeded one million by 2012.

An eight-hour drive from that glass factory mentioned above, is a complex, known informally as Foxconn City, where the iPhone is assembled. To Apple executives, Foxconn City was further evidence that China could deliver hard-working workers — and diligence — that could and would outpace their American counterparts.

Nothing like Foxconn City, China, ever exists in the United States of America.


The facility has 230,000 employees, many working six days a week 12 hours a day at the plant. Over a quarter of Foxconn’s work force lives in company barracks; many workers earn less than US$17 a day. When one Apple executive arrived during a shift change, his car was stuck in a river of employees streaming past. “The scale is unimaginable,” he was quoted to utter.

(It was reported that Foxconn employs nearly 300 guards to direct foot traffic so workers are not crushed in doorway bottlenecks. The facility’s central kitchen was stated to be to cook an average of three tons of pork and boiled 13 tons of rice daily).

Another critical advantage for Apple was that China provided engineers at a scale the United States could not match. In fact, Apple’s executives had estimated that about 8,700 industrial engineers were needed to oversee and guide the 200,000 assembly-line workers eventually involved in manufacturing iPhones. The company’s analysts had forecast it would take as long as nine months to find that many qualified engineers in the United States.

In China, it took 15 days.

Similarly. many companies moved their manufacturing from countries like China and Singapore to more affordable ones like Malaysia to localise their supply chain and procurement teams. Alongside this, many large global organizations are also moving towards centralizing their support for procurement and supply chain functions in Malaysia to consolidate business processes in search of lower labour cost.  However, this has contributed to more companies exploring, and exploiting, flexible recruitment solutions like using zero-hour contracts or hiring contractors or temporary workers on a project basis.

3] MONOPOLY CAPITAL  TOXICITY

Near to scenic Jiuzhaigou is Chengdu which, as a city in norhwest China, is a pulsating IT hub, with all the imperfect ramifications of capitalism expansiveness powering the largest, fastest and most sophisticated manufacturing system on earth, but with the excess of predatory capitalism at its worst. Within a seven-month  period, two explosions at iPad factories, including in Chengdu, killed four people and injured 77, (refer to Duhigg and Barboza article on “Human Costs Are Built Into an iPad”, published in The New York Times, January 25th, 2012 where cleaning Pad screens with n-hexane, a toxic chemical that can cause nerve damage and paralysis; other negative reports include the Taiyun assembly plant rioting (Reuter, Sep 2012, ENGADGET.com, Oct 6th. 2012).

That system has made it possible for Apple, and hundreds of other transnational companies, to build devices almost as quickly as they can be dreamed up, but at the price of destruction of labour welfare and degradation of ecological environment.

On one aspect, it was stated that Foxconn has a notorious “military-style” management system, which abused workers and caused at least 17 workers attempting suicide in the first eight months of 2010, an unprecedented tragedy in the history of electronics  (Chan and Pun 2010); also Pun, Ngai, Huilin Lu, Yuhua Guo and Yuan Shen, edits., Suicides behind the Glory of Foxconn,  Commercial Press, Hong Kong, 2011, (in Chinese).

For instance, during the worker uprising at Foxconn’s Taiyuan plant in September 2012, police and guards reportedly targeted workers who tried to record the event with their mobile phones (Mozur 2012b), showing that the short circuits move in both directions and Foxconn was significantly concerned about the consequences of these circulating video “rumours”.

In May 2014, one of Apple’s most important suppliers, NXP Semiconductors, dismissed all 24 elected union officials from IndustriALL affiliate MWAP at its plant in a special economic zone in Cabuyao, Philippines. NXP claimed the union’s peaceful industrial actions were illegal. It was clear that the company’s persistent acts of intimidation and harassment were aimed at weakening the bargaining power of the union.

Similar incidents of union busting by AMD (Advanced Micro Devices), Motorola and Harris Semiconductor are well documented in Malaysia, too, with Henry Kissinger (then an inward investment advisor to the Indonesian Government) and Jack Welsh of GE and the AFL-CIO meddling the industrial actions by Malaysian labour. The stronghold by TNC monopoly capital is such that by 1995 manufacturing goods accounted for 76.7% of all Malaysia’s exports. Just two sectors accounted for 70.2% of manufactured exports with electrical and electronic goods and electrical machinery, appliances and parts accounting for 50.3%, 16.9% respectively (Source: Department of Statistics 1996). Such is the significance of semiconductors and the component electronics sector in general, and the US investments in particular, that 14 US electronics firms accounted for 21.1% of manufactured exports and employed 31.5% of the estimated 130,000 electronics employees in 1990 (Malaysian-American Electronics Industries, 1993). In 1996, eighteen US electronics companies accounted for almost ten per cent of Malaysia’s gross manufactured exports and employed 65,000 people (Malaysian American Electronics Industry, 1998).

According to local labour activists, Foxconn was once responsible for about half of all finger-related work injuries in key hospitals of Shenzhen’s factory zones in Longhua and Guanlan. To contextualize this datum, in Shenzhen and the surrounding Pearl River Delta of south China, factory workers lose or break about 40,000 fingers on the job each year.(nytimes. “In Many Chinese Factories, Loss of Fingers and Low Pay“.

Foxconn resolved many of the injury or suicide cases through extra-legal means, including several cases that was followed closely (Pun  2011; Qiu 2012). Since 2010, it has also used large number of “student interns”, including child labour, to generate more profit by evading China’s labor contract law, thus offering yet another illustration for the informalization process: formal circuits cannot be sustained for long without tapping into informal circuits, (Ngai Pun and Jenny Chan, “Global Capital, the State, and Chinese Workers: The Foxconn Experience“, Modern China, 38, number 4, 2013, pp. 383-410).

4] THE SURPLUS VALUE

Other notable aspects of the iPhone monopoly capital saga are related here. It is uniquely American. The device’s software, for instance, and its innovative marketing campaigns were largely created in the United States. Apple recently built a $500 million data center in North Carolina. Crucial semiconductors inside the iPhone 4 and 4S are manufactured in an Austin, Texas, factory by Samsung, of South Korea.

Companies like Apple are not the real manufacturers, but merely merchandisers, and through image-product branding they are able to absorb a huge share of the surplus value created by subcontractors and component manufacturers.

It is not the ordinary workers in the Global South, but the Gobal North executives  and corporate capital who are benefiting from the structural power of the  global commodity supply chains. While Apple’s iPod is made entirely overseas, but ‘52 percent of the final sale price is counted as value added in the United States and is added to U.S. GDP’ (Intan Suwandi, Value Chains: The New Economic Imperialism, p.158). The surplus value, the source of profit, entirely  comes from in the production process, and therefore originates completely outside the USA. However, the finance and administrative procedures take place in the core centre of Global North. In a capitalist society, under a capitalistic accounting method,  the ‘surplus-value’ is regarded as ‘value added’, while in Marxist terms, these activities add no value at all (Suwandi, ibid.,p.160). With all this value accruing in the imperial centre, it is the middle-class professionals ‘including the outsized “compensation” and bonuses, commissions of corporate executives – [who capture] more than two-thirds of the total wage bill associated with iPod production’ (Suwandi, op.cit.,p.158):

where China’s labour cost is only 1.6% of product sales price

Similarly, in the international garment industry, in which production takes place almost exclusively in the Global South, direct labor cost per garment is typically around 1–3 percent of the final retail price, according to senior World Bank economist Zahid Hussain. Wage costs for an embroidered logo sweatshirt produced in the Dominican Republic run at around 1.3 percent of the final retail price in the United States, while the labor cost (including the wages of floor supervisors) of a knit shirt produced in the Philippines is 1.6 percent. Labor costs in countries such as China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Bangladesh were even considerably lower than in the above cases.  The surplus value captured from such workers is thus enormous, while being disguised by the fact that the lion’s share of so-called “value added” is attributed to activities (marketing, distribution, corporate salaries) in the wealthy importing country, removed from direct production costs.

In 2010, the Swedish retailer Hennes & Mauritz was purchasing T-shirts from subcontractors in Bangladesh, paying the workers on the order of 2–5 cents (euro) per shirt produced; (see also comparative Spice Girl’s T-shirt production cost : https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/fashion/spice-girls-probe-charity-t-shirts-over-abuse-in-bangladesh-1.3766473).

Nike, a pioneer in Non-Equity Modes of International Production, outsources all of its production to subcontractors in countries such as South Korea, China, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. In 1996, a single Nike shoe consisting of fifty-two components was manufactured by subcontractors in five different countries. The entire direct labor cost for the production of a pair of Nike basketball shoes retailing for $149.50 in the United States in the late 1990s was 1 percent, or $1.50.

Wages might not be the only reason for the disparities, but other costs like inventory and how long it takes workers to finish a job-task. Whereas General Motors had to go half a decade between major automobile redesigns, by comparison, Apple has released five iPhones in four years, maybe doubling the devices’ speed and memory yet the price has remained high for the money any consumer has to pay for a product assembled by precarious labour under exploitative workplace environment.

5] MONOPOLY-CAPITAL IMPERIALISM

And in the monopoly capitalism relentless pursuit towards product perfection (acquiring rare earth resources), shrinking the supply chain (through global commodity value chain), and ultimately the standardization of components (in different outsourced manufacturing sites), Apple is scouring new technological advancement like requesting Japanese liquid-crystal-display makers like Sharp Corporation and Japan Display Inc. as well as South Korea’s LG’s Display Co. in mass producing panels for the next iPhone using so-called in-cell technology, the people said.

This new technology integrates touch sensors into the LCD, making it unnecessary to have a separate touch-screen layer. The absence of the layer, usually about half-a-millimeter thick, not only makes the whole screen thinner, but improves the quality of displayed images, said DisplaySearch analyst Hiroshi Hayase. (Jessica E. Vascellaro, Wall Street Journal, 2012).

By June 2012, Foxconn had expressed an interest, and planning, to build a factory in Indonesia. The Jakarta Globe, (June 28th. 2012), was reported to state that Indonesia Industry Minister M.S. Hidayat spoke about Foxconn’s intentions to enter Indonesia, “bringing along technology, and [needing] some 1 million workers…….and if they do so, I will give them incentives of tax holiday, tax allowance and other facilities,” he said”. The investment is estimated to be worth more than US$1 billion, the minister added. With an expression into perspective is that Apple’s iPhones and iPads now commands for nearly three-quarter of its revenue-generation, (The Star, 21st. January 2013). However, that plant in Indonesia remains in a limbo due to political snags.

Now, the iPhones are rolling off an assembly line near Sao Paulo, Brazil; the other Apple manufacturing plants, outside China, include the Czech Republic, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea among others. Foxconn  ramped up the Sao Paulo assembly of iPhones and iPads during late 2012 , with an initial investment of 1 billion reais (US$325 million) to anchor an industrial park producing components locally. The Itu site, situated in the sleepy tourist town in Sao Paulo stated – nicknamed “The City of Exaggeration” – remains an empty expanse of dirt where bulldozers have been leveling the land since late last year. The City Council that had donated the 100-acre of land to Foxconn, has since turned against the project. “People are really frustrated, “ said Givanildo Soares da Silva the City councilor. “We were expecting all these jobs by now and it is still just empty promises.”

Foxconn had prepared a statement indicating the facility should be operational by the end of this year, (Reuters, 13th. April 2015), bringing its Brazilian workforce to more than 10,000.

Apple’s official list of its top 200 suppliers, accounting for 97 per cent of materials and manufacturing costs, includes just two companies in Brazil: Foxconn and fellow Taiwanese electronics company Lite-On Technology Corp.

Foxconn currently have five facilities in the country that make products under contract for various technology companies, including just one unit producing Apple devices in Jundiai, about 30 miles east of Itu.

A worker testing iPhones earn about US$80 per week, just US$15 above the minimum wage, and a fourth strike in as many years was brewing again.

However, Terry Guo, the founder and chairman of Foxconn, had discussed Brazilian labor rather witheringly, “….as soon as they hear ‘soccer’, they stop working. And there’s all the dancing. It’s crazy,” he had once told the Wall Street Journal in 2010.

The steep cost of consumer goods in Brazil, along with high tariffs and interest rates, has contributed to the low productivity, too. The iPhones rolling off the assembly line in Sao Paulo carry a retail price tag of nearly US$1000 for a 32-gigabyte iPhone 5S without a contract – among the highest prices in the world and about twice what they sell in the U.S.

EPILOGUE

Terry Guo, Foxconn owner and CEO once publicly stated, “as human beings are also animals, to manage one million animals gives me a headache”. Calling workers “animals” is a candid reflection that the factory only values the bodily input of its labor force, not other aspects of its humanity, (Markoff, John. 2012. “Skilled Work, Without the workers“,  New York Times).

What such a transnational corporation does is not unlike an estate manager did in a settlement plantation during colonial administration in then Malaya.

Racist humiliation, insult, and inflicted cruelty were part of the everyday lives of the “coolies” (a deratorating term thrown at the local inhabitants), while the pale-skin estate owner sipped “stengahs” (whisky and sodas), clad in sweatstained khakis, summoning a “boy” to bring a teapot or gin bottle to the veranda at the end of another hot and humid day with the topee on his head.

Bibliography

Chan, Pun and Selden, “The Politics of Global Production: Apple, Foxconn and China’s new working class”, New Technology, Work and Employment, Volume 28, Issue 2, pp. 100-115, July 2013.
Christian Fuchs, “Digital Labor and Imperialism”, Monthly Review, Volume:67, Issue 08, January 2016.”

Foster and McChesney, “The Endless Crisis“, Monthly Review, Volume 64, issue 01, May 1, 2012.

Torkil Lauesen and Zak Cope, “Imperialism and the Transformation of Values into Prices”, Monthly Review, July 1st. 2015.

Marisol Sandoval, “Foxconned: labor as the Dark Side of the Information Age”, tripleC, 11, number 2 (2013); 318-47.

Jack L. Qiu, “Goodbye iSlave: Rethinking Labor, Capitalism, and Digital Media” ,University of Illinois Press, 2016).

Jenny Chan, “A Suicide Survivor: The Life of a Chinese Worker,” New Technology, Work and Employmen, no. 2 (2013): 84–99.

Chan, Pun, and Selden, “The Politics of Global Production”; Foster and McChesney, The Endless Crisis, 119–20, 139–40, 173.

Ngai Pun and Jenny Chan, “Global Capital, the State, and Chinese Workers: The Foxconn Experience,” Modern China, 38, no. 4 (2012): 383–410; Jack L. Qiu, “Network Labor: Beyond the Shadow of Foxconn,” in Larissa Hjorth, Jean Burgess and Ingrid Richardson, eds., Studying Mobile Media: Cultural Technologies, Mobile Communication, and the iPhone, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 173–89; Jack L. Qiu, Goodbye iSlave: Rethinking Labor, Capitalism, and Digital Media, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2016).

Thousands of Foxconn Workers Strike Again in Chongqing for Better Wages, Benefits, China Labor Watch, October 8, 2014, http://chinalaborwatch.org

China Labor Bulletin Strike Map, available at http://strikemap.clb.org.hk

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The IMF Report on Malaysia 2024/2025

8/05/2024

I PRESENT OUTLOOK

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has revised the outlook for Malaysia’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by a notch to 4.4 per cent this year from its earlier prediction of 4.3 per cent, (IMF 17 Apr 2024), whilst Bank Negara Malaysia projects 4%-5% GDP growth in 2024 when global growth is expected to rebound in 2024, driven by the technology upcycle, tourism recovery, and low base effects in 2023, (Bank Negara in its annual report released on 20 Mar 2024), primarily underpinned by continued expansion in domestic demand and improvement in external demand.

The IMF growth estimation for the country is based on its World Economic Outlook, April 2024 which is to be Steady but Slow: Resilience amid Divergence. That the baseline forecast for the world economy is to continue growing at 3.2 percent during 2024 and 2025, at the same pace as in 2023. Also, it is based on an expect real (inflation-adjusted) U.S. economic growth of about 2% in 2024, higher than its initial estimate of about 0.5%.

II YEAR 2022 GLOBAL

The present year has a better forecast than whilst in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic year of 2022 when there were many encountered economic turbulences.

The first headwind is a global financial tightening. The Federal Reserve was then much more aggressive in tightening monetary policy as U.S. inflation remained stubbornly high. This was translated to tighter financial conditions for Asia. Sovereign yields had also risen, and capital outflows in emerging market Asia leaked as voluminous as in past stress episodes, even though they remained limited to a few economies.

The second headwind was the continuing conflict in Ukraine, which inevitably led to a spike in commodity prices. Most countries in Asia had also seen a deterioration of their terms of trade. This situation was an important factor behind currency depreciations insofar as in 2022.

The third headwind was the sharp and uncharacteristic slowdown in China. The IMF have had thus marked down Chinese growth for 2020 with 3.2%, its second lowest level since 1977. This reflected the impact of the zero COVID lockdowns on mobility and the crisis in China’s real estate sector. The slowdown was then estimated to have important spillover to the rest of Asia through trade and financial links. Zee

During the 2022, the headwinds were contributing to a global slowdown compared to the April World Economic Outlook. As such the IMF has had downgraded its forecast for growth in Asia and the Pacific by 0.9 percentage points in 2022 and 0.8 percentage points in 2023. So, the growth was at 4% in 2022 and 4.3% in 2023 while inflation grew more modestly in Asia in 2021. This change follows the sharp volatility in global commodities since the war in Ukraine. This increase reflected both rising food prices, particularly in Asian emerging market and developing economies, but also higher core inflation as region recovered and output gaps had loss. Indeed, core inflation had once again exceeded central bank target in most Asian economies and in most cases by a wide margin. It was argued that there should be a need for further tightening of monetary policy to ensure that inflation returns to target, and inflation expectations would then remain well anchored.

At that time, it was expected that fiscal policy would have to complement monetary policy to fight inflation around the world in Asia. Fiscal consolidation was also advised to be incorporated to stabilize public debt. Asia is now the largest area in the world and so comes at high risk of debt. It was further felt that distress positions and rising interest rates could possibly pose financial volatilities from high leverage and unhedged balance sheets and further risks increases in public debt ratios.

The challenging conjuncture then was aggravating the medium-term economic scars opened by the pandemic, which was expected to be aggravating worsen in Asian. Also, it was assessed that much of the shortfall in growth in Asia relative to other regions could be further explained by lower levels of investment, employment and productivity following the pandemic. While exact policy responses at that 2022 period would expected to depend on country specific circumstances, tackling corporate debt overhang and mitigating human capital losses would also be important for a wide range of countries in the region.

During this period, the prospect of greater geo-economic fragmentation was also a significant risk to the region. In the report, it was stated that worrying early signs of fragmentation and consequences of a destruction of global trade links. One such sign of fragmentation pressures emerged from the crises was elements of trade policy uncertainty. In fact, the spiked in 2018 amid tensions between the United States and China and had further accentuated amid Russia’s trans-border war in Ukraine as sanctions created uncertainty around future trade relations. The IMF analysis at that time had indicated that a typical shock to trade policy uncertainty like the 2018 build up of China-U.S. tensions somewhat reduced investment in the region by about 3.5% after two years. It had also projected a decreased gross domestic product by 0.4% and raised the unemployment rate by 1 percentage point.

In addition to rising uncertainty, the prevalence of harmful trade restrictions was stated to have increased since 2019. The sectoral decomposition of trade restrictions had also been shifting. The shared restrictions that target high tech sectors had also been steadily increasing since the global financial crisis. Since the war in Ukraine, restrictions targeting the energy sector had also increased sharply, while those aimed at high tech sectors had also remained high. During that period, the IMF team had considered the long-term risks of deeper fragmentation scenario, and as such have had articulated the consequences of a purely hypothetical global economy divided along the lines implied by the votes cast on March 2nd, 2022 United Nations General Assembly motion to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It was evisaged then if the world would to be demarcated into two separate blocs, then the losses could become significant. Global losses were then expected to be of 1.5% of GDP. Whereas, those in Asia were slightly over 3%, with losses forseen to be especially large for countries with a high level of openness and that have production structures that straddle both blocs.

III 2025 FUTURE

The IMF has earlier raised this year’s gross domestic product growth outlook for the region to 4.5% from the previous 4.2% estimated in October, with China’s figure upgraded by 0.4 percentage point to 4.6%.In the latest regional outlook released, the IMF pointed out that fiscal stimulus enacted over the past several months helped buoy the economy. It added that its China growth forecast for 2024 “may be revised upward,” as the country’s first-quarter growth came in stronger than expected. But it warned of several challenges for Asia’s largest economy. “Chief among risks for Asia’s economy remains a protracted property sector correction in China,” it said in the report, expressing concern that this may weaken demand and make continued deflation more likely. In addition, the IMF raised the issue of industrial overcapacity weighing on industries from steel to  automobiles recently. “Policies that boost supply, such as investment subsidies to specific companies and industries, would worsen overcapacity, reinforce deflationary pressures, and potentially provoke trade frictions,” the IMF said. China’s official purchasing managers’ index released had shown the country’s manufacturing activity grew for the second consecutive month in April.

As for Malaysia’s outlook, in its latest World Economic Outlook (WEO) entitled Steady but slow, resilience amid divergence, IMF predicted the GDP growth to remain at 4.4 per cent in 2025. It projected Malaysia’s current account balance at 2.4 per cent in 2024 and 2.7 per cent in 2025.

By ensuring such growth prospects

Characteristic Gross domestic product:


2025: US$477.83 B
2024: US$445.52 B
2023: US$415.57 B
2022: US$407.03 B

would be determined by the GDP growth in the United States which is projected to be 2.6% in 2024, before slowing to 1.8% in 2025 as the economy adapts to high borrowing costs and moderating domestic demand. According to Wang and Tyler, the economic data should “give more confidence that the US economy is recovering in additional sectors” and that “recession fears for 2024 are likely to be pushed into 2025.” On the other hand, GDP in China is expected to reach 18825.00 USD Billion by the end of 2024, according to Trading Economics ( TE) global macro models and analysts expectations. In the long-term, the China GDP is projected to trend around 19673.00 USD Billion in 2025 and 20617.00 USD Billion in 2026, according to TE econometric models.

On Malaysia, the stock market rallies in early May 2024 has given a momentum to the country’s economic wellbeing.

Malaysia’s FBM KLCI climbed to a two-year high on 7th May 2024 as gains of consumer and banking stocks extended the benchmark index’ rally to its fourth straight day.

The KLCI rose as much as 12.93 points or 0.8% to 1,610.32, its highest since May 5, 2022. The index closed at 1,605.68, still up 8.29 points or 0.52%, with 24 out of 30 constituents posting gains. 

These gains also propelled Malaysian stocks’ market capitalisation to RM2 trillion in for the first time ever. The gains appear sustainable and on track to hit 1,755 by the end of this year, CGS International has stated. The aggregated 12-month target for the KLCI stands at 1,683 points  where Bloomberg data have indicated.

By paying more attention to domestic-driven sectors, it is expected that the domestic economy will be picking up with an improved growth regime in both private consumption, and more importantly better gross fixed capital formation in the country’s economy.

Further, on the the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties and foster deeper economic collaboration between Malaysia and China, it is envisaged that with the Malaysia’s Madani initiative, launched in January 2023, aligning with the values and principles of the Community Shared Future (CSF) advocated by President Xi Jinping since 2013, Malaysia foresees significant potential for deepened collaboration with China, notably in infrastructure, the digital economy, green development, new energy vehicles, and the rare earth industry – whereby and thereby, the Malaysia Madani economic framework will be able to strengthen her national competitiveness by focusing on fiscal sustainability, excellent governance, and effective service delivery thenceon by 2025.


STORM August 2023, structuring the Madani model

Malaysianewleft, February 2024, geoeconomic challenges for the Madani model

Firestorms, May 2022, geopolitics in a multipolar world

csloh.substack, June 2022, IMF’s Malaysia

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Towards an adaptive economic development advancement

1st May 2024

PREAMBLE


Driving the dragon: China’s adaptive policymaking

By Kari McKern

Apr 29, 2024

Banner with freight wagon thin line style icon and flag of China. Freight icon. Industry and transportation concept.

China’s economic policymaking over the past few decades is a fascinating example of adaptive planning and strategic foresight. From pivoting away from reliance on globalisation to emphasising domestic infrastructure and poverty alleviation, tilting towards the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and now focusing on “high-quality development” (simultaneously upscaling advanced manufacturing while deflating the property bubble), China has demonstrated a sophisticated capacity to recalibrate its economic policies in response to the changing global and domestic landscape.

This remarkable stack of serial achievements, each built upon the success of the last and necessarily a prerequisite for the next, warrants close analysis of the methodology behind this success.

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, China found its relatively low value-added, export-reliant economy vulnerable to the shock of lower demand. The crisis prompted a strategic shift towards bolstering domestic demand and reducing reliance on foreign markets. A significant element of this strategy involved huge investments in infrastructure required to build a nation-spanning high-speed rail network. With just over 300 kilometres completed by 2008, China extended the network to more than 43,000 kilometres in the following decade.

Whereas in China

But the strategy of improving transportation had larger goals in mind. It represented a new paradigm of mega-scale development and railway engineering driven by innovation in construction. The challenges overcome in connecting the diverse and often difficult terrains of the country honed the skills of Chinese construction firms in tunnelling and bridge-building. These capabilities signalled China’s transformation into a global leader in infrastructure development while stimulating domestic segments of the economy and reducing unemployment that was a direct aftermath of the global financial crunch.

Whereas, in China

The domestic success of the high-speed rail projects demonstrated a capacity to complete large-scale infrastructure projects efficiently and effectively. The Belt and Road Initiative, announced in 2013, signalled China’s intentions to deploy its infrastructure prowess on a global scale, involving hundreds of projects across Asia, Europe, and Africa. The initiative encompassed not only transportation infrastructure like railways and ports but also energy projects and telecommunications networks.

where the circuitry of capital induces household debts  through  a financialization  capitalism mode

In China

By leveraging the experience and capabilities developed through its domestic infrastructure boom, Chinese firms embarked on BRI projects with a competitive edge in cost and expertise. This phase of Chinese economic strategy aimed at creating more expansive trade networks, essentially exporting the model of infrastructural development that had proved successful domestically. Furthermore, the BRI served to mitigate overcapacity issues within China by offloading excess production capabilities in steel, cement, and construction.

While the BRI continued to expand, domestic challenges such as the real estate bubble and concerns about environmental degradation prompted another strategic shift towards sustainable, high-quality development, which the Chinese government had anticipated in the “New Normal” strategy of the 2010s. China’s transition from a high-quantity to high-quality economic growth model began a decade ago. The shift was not a reactive measure but a policy-driven adjustment in response to changes in the global market. The Chinese government planned for a gradual deceleration of GDP growth from 10% to around 6%, aiming to maintain this rate before the unforeseen impact of the pandemic. This strategy marked a deliberate shift from high-speed growth to more sustainable, moderate growth rates, focusing on enhancing the quality rather than the quantity of economic expansion.

Indeed, a paper published by the International Monetary Fund titled ‘Debt and Growth: Is There a Magic Threshold?’’ stated that countries with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 90 per cent and above could experience a dramatic  decline in economic growth.
Source: Martin Ravallion 15 April 2019

The World Bank Report has this to say:

In China

The transition towards high-quality development involved prioritising innovation, higher value-added industries, and green development.

The new emphasis is on developing sectors like technology and services, which are less resource-intensive and more sustainable in the long term. This shift is supported by policies that foster innovation, such as increased spending on research and development, and initiatives to enhance the technological capabilities of industries.

Strategic goals are also supported by China’s series of Five-Year Plans. These plans have consistently emphasised infrastructure development, technological advancement, and now increasingly, sustainability. The 14th Five-Year Plan, for example, places significant emphasis on innovation, green development, and the digital economy, which directly support the infrastructure and technological goals of the BRI.

In China

The secret sauce of China’s policymaking process involves several key steps.

Before formalising any major initiative, the Chinese government often employs experts from think tanks, academia, and industry to conduct extensive research and feasibility studies. This helps in shaping the policy’s objectives, mechanisms, and potential impacts.

Major policies often originate from the top leadership, with significant input from the CCP’s highest echelons, including the Politburo and its Standing Committee. President Xi Jinping personally announced and championed the BRI.

For sweeping initiatives, coordination across various government bodies is crucial. This includes ministries such as Foreign Affairs, Commerce, and others that deal with infrastructure, finance, and international cooperation.

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), along with other relevant ministries, also plays a crucial role in formulating the detailed policy framework. They draft plans, guidelines, and funding mechanisms.

Once formulated, the policy is queued for approval by the CCP’s central committee and the State Council. After approval, it is officially promulgated and the implementation phase begins. This phase involves local governments, state-owned enterprises, and private sector players.

Chinese policies typically undergo periodic reviews. Feedback mechanisms are in place to monitor progress and challenges, allowing for adjustments to the policy as necessary.

The BRI, as a global infrastructure and economic development initiative, is managed with a high degree of state coordination, aiming to enhance trade routes and economic ties between Asia, Europe, and Africa, reflecting China’s strategic economic and geopolitical interests. This initiative is a prime example of China’s top-down approach to policymaking, where strategic visions set by the leadership dictate policy directions and implementation mechanisms.

In conclusion, China’s economic development over the past few decades has been characterised by adaptive planning, strategic foresight, and a remarkable capacity to recalibrate in response to changing global and domestic landscapes. From the pivot towards domestic infrastructure post-2008, to the global ambitions of the BRI, and now the focus on high-quality, sustainable development, China has demonstrated a sophisticated approach to economic strategy. This approach is underpinned by a centralised, top-down policymaking process that allows for the effective implementation of major initiatives. As China continues to navigate the complexities of the global economy, its ability to adapt and strategise will undoubtedly shape the planet’s economic trajectory for years to come.


Kari McKern

Kari McKern, who lives in Sydney, is a retired career public servant and librarian and IT specialist. She has maintained a life time interest in Asian affairs and had visited Asia often, and writes here in a private capacity.

________

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The China’s overcapacity issue – and must be forced to commit an economic suicide

24/04/24

PREAMBLE

First it was that since the U.S. cannot outcompete China, then it is not by accelerating the growth of U.S. economy but by slowing China’s.

| Annual GDP Growth | MR Online
As the U.S. could not suffocate that civilisational state in Asia, therefore, the hegemon in a Hyper-Imperialism state has to persuade China to commit an economic suicide, (John Ross, monthlyreview 20/04/24).

However, instead of devoting more attention to domestic economics in U.S., this global war machine is building military bases in a hegemonic hubris straining under multilateralism as a rogue’s in itself – and contributing to global growth problems – by disinvestment compared to China state enterprises, (see detailed exploration and elaboration in STORM April 2023), inevitably inducing China’s better socio-economic performance compared to the collapse of American capitalism with an increasing accompanying national debt crisis.

Now, unable to compete efficiently with China, the U.S. geo-political economics praxis is destabilising world economy through deglobalisation the supply chain especially with China‘s manufacturing prowess with a socialism efficiency economic development model , and to promote an alternative news campaign about China’s overcapacity as part of peaked China narrative, (John Ross, May 2023).

Here, from the pages of Philippa Jones of CHINA POLICY – a Beijing-based research and advisory company responding to China’s changing domestic policy and its geopolitical impact – we continue with

Beijing debates overcapacity

The diverging perspectives among well-known commentators Huang Yiping 黄益平 and Lù Fēng 路风 (to distinguish him from Lú Fēng 卢锋, who, just to confuse us all, also contributes to the debate). They are all colleagues at the same famously radical university.

From a campus nearby, Sun Liping 孙立平 posits that the current overcapacity prefigures the end of a ruling paradigm. It reminded me of his analysis just after the lockdowns. Our brief from 2023 ‘post lockdown realities’ highlighted Sun (one of the PRC’s economically savvy, bellwether intellectuals) and his brilliant ‘neo-dual structure’, along with his incisive diagram explaining it… a year on his theory is more convincing than ever.

The New Era sees new postures towards excess capacity

Long circulating in the media, overcapacity has become the hot-button issue in the PRC–West disaffection. US Commerce Secretary Janet Yellen’s early April 2024 visit to the PRC largely centred on it. In a meeting with German Chancellor Scholz on 16 April 2024, General Secretary Xi told Scholz that both sides should address production capacity ‘objectively’.

Yellen proposed formalising dialogue on excess industrial capacity in EVs (electric vehicles), solar panels and batteries, warning the US would not accept the ‘decimation’ of its industry. The PRC, she insisted, is simply too large to export its way to growth.

The US is not alone in its concerns. An EU probe into the PRC’s trade practices in EVs opened in EVs opened in October 2023; another, centred on wind turbines, started in April 2024. The bloc would later that month update and expand a list of sectors potentially distorted by PRC measures, including key strategic emerging industries like semiconductors and renewable energy products, opening the door for more anti-dumping investigations.

Excess capacity has been  characteristic of the PRC economy for decades. Given its move up the value-added chain, excess capacity becomes a nagging geopolitical topic. The issue is Beijing’s ability/desire to do something about it.

Beijing’s supply side

Beijing’s understanding of the ‘supply side’ clearly differs from that of mature economies. As Xi explained the ‘new development paradigm’ to a February 2023 Politburo study session, Beijing seeks to improve demand’s efficacy in guiding supply while seeing higher-quality supply drive demand. Overcapacity might then pose problems but would eventually solve itself, given ideal central policymaking.

Conflicting views on overcapacity pervade the PRC leadership. Addressing domestic audiences, the centre rails against overcapacity. It was identified as a top problem in certain sectors in both December 2023’s CEWC (Central Economic Work Conference) and the 2024 Government Work Report. Specific sectors were not identified. CEWC 2023’s economic agenda featured supply-side structural reform, a cause first flagged back in the early 2010s, when a major increase in overcapacity was last faced.

Faced with overcapacity as a part of broader rivalry with the West, officialdom strikes a different tone. Wang Wentao 王文涛 Minister of Commerce dismisses charges of overcapacity in EVs: advantage comes not from subsidies but from PRC firms’ constant innovation and supply chain improvement.

The overcapacity debate is deemed another case of the US damaging regular trade in the name of national security, explains Liao Min 廖岷 a deputy finance minister. Overcapacity simply demonstrates the price mechanism at work: prices fall as supply outstrips demand. Both should soon readjust.

Global markets must be considered. Demand for solar panels is forecast to quadruple by 2030, far beyond what current capacity can supply. The PRC simply fulfils domestic demand while contributing to the international green transition.

Overcapacity is overhyped, editorialises Xinhua. Developed states routinely seek markets for goods in which they have advantages, yet when the PRC does the same, it is deemed disruptive. Put simply, the West fears losing its monopoly position in the global division of labour and the wealth it brings. Proclaimed ‘decoupling’ is meant to subdue latecomers like the PRC, add Xinhua.

cyclical conditions

More sectors are reaching overcapacity (defined as production exceeding demand and rational output levels), estimates Lú Fēng 卢锋 Peking University National Development Institute, including

petrochemical raw materials

automobiles

above all gas-powered

batteries

microchips

NEVs (new energy vehicles)

The PRC has undergone three waves of overcapacity since reform and opening, reckons Liang Yongmei 梁泳梅 CASS Institute of Industrial Economics. These were of

  • consumer goods during the late 1990s;
  • certain industrial goods in some firms (particularly cement, steel and aluminium) from 2003 to 2007;
  • generalised and including a wider range of industrial goods from 2010 to 2016

These cycles were closely linked to global economic performance: as demand falls, capacity utilisation drops due to falling orders and mounting stocks. But that fails to account for their stubborn recurrence. Constant PRC industry upgrades repeatedly  generate swathes of old capacity, under certain circumstances deemed ‘over’. Worsening the problem, local governments routinely help firms boost capacity to consolidate the tax base and create jobs. Overcapacity keeps showing its ugly head. Capacity utilisation in high-tech goods is for the first time falling faster than in conventional industry, laments Wu Ge 伍戈 Changjiang Securities. Even an industry leader like batteries giant CATL reaches only 70 percent capacity utilisation.

The PRC morphed from a society facing chronic scarcity to one with constant overcapacity in 1997, explains critical sociologist Sun Liping 孙立平, due to its investment-led growth model. The current manifestation may be the end of the road. Solving overcapacity is no easy matter of increasing demand. This is true of consumption above all. Investment-led growth is the raison d’etre of institutions like banks, the fiscal state and equities marketsReforming them is intractable yet a prerequisite to solving overcapacity, as Sun cogently shows. 

growing debate

As Beijing refines its narrative, domestic debate on overcapacity grows in the gaps. Different this time, explains Lú Fēng 卢锋, is the spread of overcapacity to high-end emerging industries, not least those with lucrative global markets. Given the lack of global mechanisms to coordinate (over)capacity, industry consolidation and increased exports are to be expected.

Take care in such moments, warns Huang Yiping 黄益平 Peking University National School of Development. Developing new productive forces will entail maintaining openness with other countries, not least advanced economies. Now massive, the PRC economy can no longer export its excess capacity without punitive blowback. Policy must focus on innovation, not capacity, maintaining good relations while advancing modernisation.

Demurring, Lù Fēng 路风 Peking University School of Government (note different name) contends supply-side structural reform has cramped growth over the past decade. More industrial production is always good, driving demand for intermediate goods in a virtuous cycle essential for development. Focusing only on ‘strategic emerging’ or future industries dooms the economy to stagnation. Overcapacity concerns are, hence, misplaced at best and fatal at worst.

a dangerous moment

Adding critically to the danger, explains Sun Liping, is reentry to overcapacity, just as the world does likewise. Decoupling and reshoring efforts have generated massive investment in manufacturing in all major economies, including the US, Europe and Japan. Trade wars and protectionism now seem unavoidable.

Beijing reacts as if cornered. In early April 2024, Xi told US President Biden he would not stand by as the US kept suppressing PRC initiatives to advance its technology and economy. Measures designed to penalise overcapacity in those terms are easily grasped–irresistibly so in Beijing. Accepted as a problem, the ominous geopolitical shadow cast by overcapacity may force Beijing to alter its posture.

profiles


Huang Yiping 黄益平 | Peking University National School of Development president

Huang Yiping 黄益平 | Peking University National School of Development president

For Huang, nurturing new productive forces entails maintaining openness, above all with advanced countries. Tech exchange supports total factor productivity, a hallmark of new productive forces and blessed by Xi.

Overcapacity again becomes controversial because the PRC fails to handle its causes: frequent imbalance between investment and consumption, coupled with (state-led) excessive resource allocation to certain sectors. The PRC economy’s sheer scale is new. Domestic supply and demand lose relevance: domestic changes directly impact global markets in ways that other export-oriented developmentalist states were able to avoid.

To avoid conflict, industrial policy should focus on innovation rather than capacity, with strict adherence to multilateral fora like the G20 and rebalancing the economy towards consumption.

Holding an economics PhD from the Australian National University, macro policy heavyweight Huang divides his working life between scholarship, the private sector and government. His experience includes Columbia University, CitiGroup, Caixin Media Group, PBoC’s monetary policy committee and the China Finance 40 Forum. He replaced Yao Yang 姚洋 as head of Peking University’s National School of Development in early 2024.


Lu Feng 路风 | Peking University School of Government

Lu Feng 路风 | Peking University School of Government

Obliquely challenging the pressure to de-capacitise, Lu insists overcapacity is overhyped, a manifestation of anxiety about rivalry with US economic power. Supply-side structural reform has indeed cramped development over the past decade. Becoming wealthier and raising living standards entails producing more, regardless of demand from moment to moment.

Take steel as an example, says Lu: production was capped centrally in 2016. Yet, a bare decade later, domestic demand far exceeds the cap: those limits were, this implies, pointless in the first place.

Feng warns that the focus on innovation must not be too narrow. Intermediate goods must indeed have greater scale than strategic emerging industries: their economic contribution is not to be underrated. Large traditional industries are needed to create vaunted ‘future industries’: new tech applications emerge only when experts in existing sectors create them. 

After graduating from China Minzu (’Minorities’) University in 1982, Lu worked in state agencies. He took a PhD in Political Science from Columbia University from 1991 to 1998 and completed a postdoc at Berkeley. He returned to teach at Tsinghua University in 1999. He later directed the Enterprise and Government Research Institute in the School of Public Management, moving to Peking University in 2003.


Sun Liping 孙立平 | Tsinghua University Department of Sociology professor
Sun Liping 孙立平 | Tsinghua University Department of Sociology professorThe era of large-scale concentrated consumption experienced previously is basically over, said Sun in a speech on 14 April 2024. The PRC economy is in a period of contraction, and the consumer sector too is at a turning point. In conventional consumption’s current stage of gradually dividing, he said, ‘the poor cannot afford, the middle class does not dare, and the rich do not know what to consume’ has become a common impression. Given differentiating consumption, and the background of economic contraction, consumption of society as a whole faces a downward trend. Overcapacity is just a manifestation of this reality.Born in a Hebei village in 1959, Sun studied journalism at Peking University 1978–81, taking up sociology at Nankai University 1981–83. A journalist for some years, he joined Tsinghua University in 1993. He famously helped advise a younger Xi Jinping’s PhD dissertation, the resulting political capital arguably allowing him to test the limits of intellectual expression. His bestselling 1996 book, The Road to Modernisation, argued that politics had been outpaced by economic growth, brewing corruption, inequity, and unrest. With over 300 other intellectuals, Sun co-signed the ‘Charter 08’ open letter to the Party, urging political reform. He warned Caijing Magazine’s annual Forecasting and Strategy conference in 2013 of a ‘crisis of legitimacy.’ Widely reported, this caused a stir. Other notable works include Social Reconstruction (2009), China’s Political Reform (2011), and Crisis of Legitimacy (2013).


RELATED REFERENCES

How China Works

China’s Future Industries

China’s Foreign Direct Investment

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Global growth economy under the calamity of capitalism

18/04/24

INTRODUCTION

The world economy is confronting a situational environment where the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region and the Ukrainian cross-border conflicts continuance are serving a sobering reality of geopolitical dimensions affecting geoeconomics realities. The escalation of tension in the Middle East combined with growing instability about Ukraine demonstrates once again how significant geopolitical decisions impact upon geoeconomics policies under calamity of capitalism regime. 

The global growth rate — if one takes out the cyclical ups and downs — has slowed steadily since the 2008-09 global financial crisis (GFC’08). However, it is concurred that without policy intervention and leveraging emerging technologies, the stronger growth rates of the past are more unlikely to return.

It can also be fairly stated that shrouded with several headwinds, future growth prospects are where capitalism is shoved into a calamity mode. Global growth will slow to just above 3 percent by 2029, according to five-year ahead projections in an IMF latest World Economic Outlook.  The IMF analysis  shows that growth could drop by about a percentage point below the pre-pandemic (2000-19) average by the end of the decade. This threatens to reverse improvements to living standards, and the unevenness of the slowdown between richer and poorer nations could limit the prospects for global income convergence.

A persistent low-growth scenario, combined with high interest rates, could more likely than ever insert debt sustainability at risk whereby restricting the government’s capacity to counter economic slowdowns and invest in social welfare or environmental initiatives.

Further, there are indications in the expectations of a weaker growth rate that would- and could – discourage more investment in capital and technologies, possibly even deepening a capitalism slowdown.

All this is accentuated, and exacerbated, by strong headwinds from geoeconomic fragmentation, and harmful unilateral trade and industrial policies.

Here, the Collective on Geoeconomics (CoG) asserts that in the last two decades of the twentieth century, the world has witnessed the development and expansion of commercial, productive, and financial globalisation. This new phase in the world economy was marked by increased trade in goods and services, greater international participation in the productive operations of transnational companies, and the intense circulation of capital at the international level in a new dynamic of world capitalism. Faced with the demands of financial capital – the dynamic centre of this new stage of capitalism – countries have increased the extent to which they have opened their economies externally and deregulated their markets, reducing state participation in the economy in pursuit of the ideal of a ‘minimal state’ – despite the unsatisfied basic needs of a huge portion of the population. Neoliberal policies have been implemented in many countries. These policies seek to dismantle both the welfare state in Europe and the few advances that have been made in Latin America towards enshrining democracy and the rule of law in the constitution and are presented as necessary conditions for economic development and overcoming ‘underdevelopment’.

Public Intellectuals like Dadabhai Naoroji and Sayyid Jamaluddin al-Afghani had rejected the Western imperialism regime of expropriation. They criticised how parts of the global South were being transformed – and ruined – by Western imperialism.

Consolidated to the imperialism premise is the super-exploitation of labour as developed by a group of economists – professors Ruy Mauro Marini, Theotônio dos Santos, Vânia Bambirra, Luiz Fernando Victor, Teodoro Lamounier, Albertino Rodriguez, and Perseu Abramo using and applying Marxist methodology. They define super-exploitation of labour as to the intensified exploitation of the workforce, resulting in an extraction of surplus value that exceeds the limits historically established in core countries. This becomes a fundamental feature of the capitalist system in underdeveloped economies, since foreign capital and local ruling classes benefit from workers’ low wages and precarious working conditions as well as the absence of labour rights, thus maximising their profits and capital accumulation to the intensified exploitation of the workforce, resulting in an extraction of surplus value that exceeds the limits historically established in core countries. This becomes a fundamental feature of the capitalist system in underdeveloped economies, since foreign capital and local ruling classes benefit from workers’ low wages and precarious working conditions as well as the absence of labour rights, thus maximising their profits and capital accumulation

From this perspective of the combined and unequal development of capitalist accumulation in its globalised totality, one begins to understand that the phenomenon of underdevelopment grips the dependent economy. Thus, a relationship of dependence is created and fed by the development of capitalist industry, which transforms some countries supplying raw materials into receptacles of wealth that drain into the industrialised core. The super-exploitation of the workforce is necessary for this drainage to be sustained, which exposes the real process of the production and reproduction of capital in Latin American countries during an era of neo-imperialism.

TOTAL PRODUCTIVITY FACTORS

There are a variety of policies — from improving labour and capital allocation across firms to tackling labour shortages caused by aging populations in major economies —could collectively rekindle medium-term growth.

The key drivers of such capitalism economic growth parameter include labour, capital, and how efficiently these two resources are used, a concept known as the total factor productivity (TFP). Between these three factors, more than half of the growth decline since the crisis was driven by a deceleration in TFP growth. TFP increases with technological advances and improved resource allocation, allowing labour and capital to move toward more productive firms.

Then, resource allocation is also another critical element in capital growth factor. Yet, in recent years, increasingly inefficient distribution of resources across firms has dragged down TFP and, with it, global growth.

It is understood that much of this rising misallocation stems from persistent barriers, such as policies that favour or penalize some firms irrespective of their productivity, that prevent capital and labour from reaching the most productive companies. This limits their growth potential. It is stated by IMF if resource misallocation has had not worsened, TFP growth could have been 50 percent higher and the deceleration in growth would have been less severe.

With due concern, there are two other factors that have also slowed growth. Demographic pressures in major economies, where the proportion of working-age population is shrinking, have weighed on labour growth. Meanwhile, weakening business investment has stunted capital formation, and its accompanying capital accumulation impulse.

CoG asserts that it is not population pressure per se in the emerging economies but the exploitation of labour thereon that creates the dependency development patterns which encourages capital to skew towards preferred industry – and firms – in maximal capital accumulation in allegiance to local compradore capital as part of the rentier capitalism scene, (STORM 2021, inequality and ethnocratic hegemony).

In a country case like Malaysia where advocacy of IT promotion by the World Bank is being monopoly-financed by Global North information technology platforms by deepening infrastructural platforms stronghold ,(STORM April 2023) where even the maintenance of fibre optics conduits and routers is dominated by monopoly capital (STORM January 2023, marine cabotage under netarchical capitalism).

The country’s Industry 4.0 initiative is typically maintained by ethnocapital-ethnocratic-clientel-capitalism that neglects the small manufacturing enterprises (SMEs) in the overall industrialisation processes, (STORM June 2023). There is much to discourage this mode of industrial policy arrangement where digital labour is short-circuited, (STORM, March 2023).

Thus, dependent capitalism is defined, first, by the transfer of value from the periphery to the core as a structural dynamic; second, by the super-exploitation of labour as compensatory for the local bourgeoisie; and, third, by a particular type of reproduction of capital in which production and consumption are separated; an expanded elaboration in STORM 2023, foreign capital and social struggles.

ON MID-TERM SITUATIONS

According to United Nations projections, it is accepted that demographic pressures are set to increase in most of the major economies thereby causing an imbalance in world labour supply and therefore moderating global growth. The working-age population will increase in low-income and some emerging economies, whereas China and most advanced economies (excluding the United States) will face a labour squeeze. By 2030, it is expected that the growth rate of the global laboir supply to slide to just 0.3 percent — a fraction of its pre-pandemic average.

Some resource misallocation may correct itself over time, as labour and capital gravitate toward more productive firms. This will go some way toward mitigating the TFP slowdown even as structural and policy barriers may continue to slow the process. Technological innovation may also lessen the slowdown.

As situations stand, it is forseen that overall the pace of TFP growth is likely to continue to decline, driven by challenges such as the increasing difficulty of coming up with technological breakthroughs, stagnation in educational attainment, and a slower process by which less developed economies can catch up with their more developed peers.

It is expected that absent of more major technological advances or structural reforms, the global economic growth can only achieve 2.8 percent by 2030, well below the historical average of 3.8 percent.

OF IMMEDIATE CONCERNS

Here are some concerning issues – pertaining to the oil and gas industry – with the threatening MENA geopolotical crisis that affect global economy under the strand of calamity in capitalism, as extracted from Professor Adam Tooze’s Chartbook #275:

  1. Oil is still flowing. Straits of Hormuz supply 18 million b/d of oil flows through the Persian Gulf – c. 18% of global demand. Unlike the Red Sea, there are no alternative routes. If this is at risk in any serious way, the impact on oil markets will be dramatically chaotic.
  2. Risk of major disruption has clearly increased, but this likely be reflected in options market most directly.
  3. China’s demand growth is widely expected to slow this year after an exceptionally strong 2023 as post-Covid travel subsides and its economy slows, but Chinese petrochemicals demand remains robust, though both India and the Middle East will support such demand.
  4. OPEC+ has been keeping supply tight, but since April there have been signs that they are likely to agree to increase supply at a June 1 meeting. It may choose to keep market guessing by calling monthly meetings and slowly increasing the price of oil.
  5. There is still plenty of spare capacity with Saudi, Emirates and Iraq keeping 5 m barrels per day off global market = 5% of world demand and more than what Iran is producing. It is assured that only an actual military interruption to Gulf flow shall in some ways to threaten a serious shortage.

6. Then, there is the US (SPR) Strategic Petroleum Reserve (half its former level) but still enough to move the market.

As the Dallas Fed analysis shows, measured relative to the IEA standard of net imports, the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve is more than adequate to support its capitalist economy because the US is now a major net exporter of oil. 

GLOBAL GROWTH REVIVAL

The IMF analysis further evaluates the impact of policies on labour supply and resource allocation, set against the backdrop of the rapid advance of artificial intelligence, public debt overhang, and geoeconomic fragmentation, (exemplified by country case studies in STORM January 2024, STORM April 2024, STORM June 2023, respectively).

Through examining scenarios featuring ambitious, but achievable, policy shifts that address resource misallocation – it is by improving the flexibility of product and labour markets, trade openness, and financial development. The IMF team also consider policies aimed at enhancing labour supply or productivity by reforming retirement and unemployment benefits, supporting childcare, expanding re-training and re-skilling programs, and improving integration of migrant workers, as well as the removal of social and gender barriers.

Their findings indicate that the benefits of increasing labour force participation, integrating more migrant workers into advanced economies, and optimizing talent allocation in emerging markets are comparatively modest.

By contrast, reforms that enhance productivity and fully leverage AI are key for reviving growth in the medium term. The analysed findings suggest that focused policy actions to enhance market competition, trade openness, financial access, and labor market flexibility could lift global growth by about 1.2 percentage points by 2030. The potential of AI to boost labor productivity is uncertain but potentially substantial as well, possibly adding up to 0.8 percentage points to global growth, depending on its adoption and impact on the workforce.

In the long run,  innovation-driven policies will be crucial to sustaining global growth.

CoG is of the opinions that innovative policies may not be able to sustain developing economies because the appreciation of the US dollar has immense impact upon these affected countries, that is, a strong dollar is bad for the global economy.

The currencies of G20 countries are almost all depreciating against the dollar. The decline since the beginning of the year has reached 8% for the yen and 5.5% for the South Korean won, led by the Turkish lira at 8.8%. Both developed and emerging economies have seen currencies weaken at an accelerating pace, with the Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, and euro falling 4.4%, 3.3%, and 2.8%, respectively, in developed economies.

Governments are increasingly concerned about the falling value of their currencies. Emerging economies are particularly sensitive to the negative effect, as the burden of dollar-denominated debt increases along with larger interest expenses due to higher rates.

Several countries have already begun to take actions. On April 1, Brazil’s central bank intervened in the foreign exchange market for the first time since President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva took office. Although the government and the central bank have not clearly explained their intentions, some in the market believe that the purpose is to correct the depreciation of the real.

Several local media outlets report that Bank Indonesia also decided to intervene in the currency market this month. The objective is to correct the level of the rupiah, which is at a four-year low. But the rupiah has been on a downward trend since those reports, falling beyond the milestone level of 16,000 rupiah to the dollar. According to Reuters, Bank Indonesia Gov. Perry Warjiyo made a statement at the end of January that was intended to check the currency’s depreciation. The central bank has taken steps to intervene, but they have not been fully effective. Indeed, by mid-April 2024, the rupiah tumbled to its weakest
in four years as the market reopened after the Eid al-Fitr holidays, prompting the
central bank to intervene in the market to stem its slide.
The rupiah has declined as much as 2.27% to 16,200 per US dollar, its weakest level since early April 2020, leading the losses among emerging Asia currencies, (theedge ceo briefing, 17/4/24).

Turkey’s central bank raised its policy rate by 5% to 50% in March in response to the lira’s depreciation and accelerating inflation. …  “We are feeling a bit more hawkish than before,” Eli Remolona, the Philippine central bank governor, said recently, citing the higher risk of inflation.

These concerns are not just limited to developing economies, Japan and other developed countries are nervous about the incessant depreciation of their currencies.

While the Malaysian prime minister talks about “de-dollarization”, the Ringgit would hit RM5 before such measure could see any meaningful results. Those who argued that a weak currency is good for exporters have forgotten that it equally impacts imports – hence the cost of living had skyrocketed. To add salt to the wound, exporters and corporations are holding foreign reserves in dollar, refusing to convert it back to Ringgit, ( see STORM, March 2024, on depreciating ringgit).


This essay is based on Chapter 3 of the World Economic Outlook, “Slowdown in Global Medium-Term Growth: What Will it Take to Turn the Tide?”, reflecting the research by Chiara Maggi, Cedric Okou, Alexandre B. Sollaci, and Robert Zymek; supplemented with additional datasets and extra information contents by the Collective of Geoeconomics team.

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China’s growth strategy in the next industrial revolution

10/04/24

Political economists Radhika Desai (Professor, University of Manitoba; Director, Geopolitical Economy Research Group) and Michael Hudson (Distinguished Research Professor of Economics at University of Missouri) are joined by Beijing-based scholar Mick Dunford – who is the Professor Emeritus of Geography at Sussex University, and now working at the Chinese Academy of Sciences – to discuss China’s economy and debunk Western media myths, addressing accusations that consumption is too low, fears of “Japanification”, the role of exports, and the new Chinese growth strategy.

We shall summarise the discussion (scheer post and YouTube) by utilising their presented illustrated graphics.

  1. That China remains an upper middle income country where the average levels of consumption are less than those in economically much, much richer countries.

And that the decline in the share of household consumption expenditure has occurred as GDP has increased at astonishing rates. Therefore, the actual real value of consumption in China has increased enormously over the course of time, and it continues to increase at this present point in time. It is a country which has 400 million people who are in the middle income categories with an enormous market potentialities.

A supplementary graph shall be this:

2. Poverty Alleviation in the Contiguous Destitute Area

In these places, there were 80 million people whose income was less than US$1.96 per day, but, between 2013 and 2020, every single one of these people were lifted above the poverty line and often lifted well above it through an extraordinary program of poverty alleviation.

3. Gross Fixed Capital Formation

And, that China has grown essentially by increasing the share of investment in its GDP.

If you invest, you employ people; the people who are employed receive wages whereby they are used to purchase goods and services. So, investment actually also gets translated into an increased consumption pattern.

4. Industrial Manufacturing “Value-Added”

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has documented that China’s global lead extends to 37 out of 44 technologies covering technological fields like defense, space, robotics, energy, environment, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, advanced materials, and quantum technology.

China is undergoing this current process of structural change designed to significantly upgrade existing industries, basically to use new technologies in order to upgrade and improve the quality of these industries.

The next chart plots world GDP growth from the middle of the 1960s and world export growth. What it shows very, very clearly is that the growth rate of China’s world exports (real growth) considerably exceeded the rate of growth of world GDP.

5. Export Growth

China’s exports grew at something like 18.1% per year up until the financial crisis over a period of nearly 30 years which are absolutely astonishing. Then with the 2008 financial crisis, exports dropped to 9.4%. Since 2013, China’s exports have grown at 5.7%.

In the case of China, this change in the global situation obviously is one of the reasons for China’s somewhat slower growth, but China’s rate of growth is still consistent with its long term objectives in relation to increasing GDP, and GDP per head, by 2035.

6. China’s position in World GDP and Export Growth

China’s growth, the market stimulus for China’s growth is increasingly coming from China’s own economy. Similarly, this parameter goes for the import of intermediate inputs. China is importing fewer intermediate inputs which means that firms within China are increasingly producing the inputs that were previously being imported into China. So, in that sense, growth in China and also in the rest of the developing world, though to a lesser extent, is becoming less reliant on trade growth.

7. Gross Exports as share of GDP.

This red line shows China, gross exports as a share of gross output or GDP from 1995 to 2017. One can see that this is the developing countries excluding China:

China is importing fewer intermediate inputs, which means that firms within China are increasingly producing the inputs that were previously being imported into China. The growth in China, and also in the rest of the developing world, is becoming less reliant on trade growth.

8. Export-linked manufacturing as a percentage of manufacturing

Export-linked manufacturing peaked for China in about 2006; since then it has declined. The domestic sales of China’s manufactured goods is growing faster than export sales.

9. China’s Domestic Market

China’s domestic market is going to be a significant focus of future growth.

Germany’s BMW has moved its production to China. China is not importing chemicals from Germany because BASF has moved its chemical operations to China. There is a movement of Germany into China, and much of the increase and the decrease in world trade relative to GDP, which means domestic self-reliance, is a result of China’s role itself.

For the Belt and Road Initiative and implementation processes, it is to make them independent of the US and NATO countries because the US and NATO countries do not want more trade with China. The World Trade Organization is really coming to an end.

10. Global South Economies

China is the main trade partner of 140 countries in the world that are largely part of the Global South. In the recent neoliberal era-pandemic period-globalisation fractionalised situation, the Global South economies have actually grown relatively slower. That’s one of the reasons for this relatively slow growth of China’s world trade recently that has come to depend more on these emerging and low-income countries.

A supplementary graph on China Exports to selective major Global South trading partners:

However, South-South trade is going to grow very substantially. China has a very strong commitment to the maintenance of an open world economy, and in the establishment of complementary relationships.

In the longer term, the export market will continue to play a really very significant role in China’s growth. This will be much more connected with the development of other parts of the Global South.

A supplementary graph on China Exports to Global South vs US + Europe:

11. Uptake of productivity by increasing investment

The really important things about what is happening in China now is that it is talking about a new path of modernization that is different from the path that was followed by the Western world, and it involves many dimensions.

Obviously, it involves emphasis upon productivity increasing technologies; what drives growth is actually the rapid diffusion of technology. The rapid diffusion of technology depends on investment. So investment in a sense leads to rapid uptake of productivity thereby increasing investment in a circular pattern.

12. Socialism with Chinese characteristics

Chinese thought is obviously a synthesis of Marxism, but also with earlier Chinese traditions.

If one looks at Chinese ideas about international relations, the core concept is harmony. Actually, it is the idea of harmony and living in harmonious relationships with others, which means understanding the kind of internal dynamic of others and then working with them to develop their potentialities, rather than imposing upon nation-states.

The core concepts in Chinese international relations are things like guānxi (关系), or “relationality”; or gòngshēng (共生), which means symbiosis; or tiānxià (天下), or “all under heaven”.

China looks at the whole economy by looking at growth of the whole society as an organism. One is talking about transformation whereby transformation and redistribution is much more important than growth, (World Bank, 2022); the World Bank and DRC have identified the whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach.

EPILOGUE

Based on domestic great circulation, we will coordinate and promote the construction of a strong domestic market and the construction of a trade powerhouse (贸易强国), form a powerful gravitational field to attract global resources and factors of production, promote the coordinated development of domestic and foreign demand, imports and exports, and the introduction of foreign capital and foreign investment, and accelerate the cultivation of new advantages to be used in international cooperation and competition. China’s 14th Five Year Plan: Article XIII – Promoting domestic-international dual circulation.

Article 13 of this policy refers to promoting a domestic-international dual circulation. Based on domestic great circulation, the country will coordinate and promote the construction of a strong domestic market and the construction of a trade powerhouse. Therefore, both domestic market and foreign market are important to form a powerful gravitational field to attract global resources and factors of production, promote the coordinated development of domestic and foreign demand, imports and exports, and the introduction of foreign capital and foreign investment, and accelerate the cultivation of new advantages to be used in international cooperation and competition.


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Low-income and emerging economies with hidden debts

12/04/24

INTRODUCTION

KS Jomo and Ngongo have expressed that since the 2008 global financial crisis, developing nations have to borrow massively from private finance – at exorbitant interest rates – to scale funding up ‘from billions to trillions’. Indeed, servicing external debt now blocks progress whereby governments have cut back spending in line with conditions or advice from powerful foreign economic agencies as such. Onset with the global debt crisis in 1979 the transition and developing Global South economies had paid cumulative US$7.673 trillion in external debt service, see Paulo Nakatani and Rémy Herrera.

In fact, the external debts of developing and transition countries reached 29% of their GDP in 2019. The short-term debts rose to more than one-quarter of the total external debts alone.

The Global South debt even then during the same period has increased from US$618 billion in 1980 to US$3.150 trillion in 2006, according to figures published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The external debt of this group of countries, comprising 145 member states, will continue to grow throughout 2007, according to the IMF, to more than US$3.350 trillion. The debt of the Asian developing countries alone could rise to US$955 billion, even though they have already repaid, in interest and capital, far more than the original amount due in 1980!

Malaysia 2019 external debt was RM$231225.9 million, (Asia Development Bank, External Debt Outstanding in Asia and the Pacific, Asian Development Outlook, April 2020).

According to a report to the Asian Development Bank, in September 2020, by Donghyun Park, Arief Ramayandi, Shu Tian  stating inter alia that borrowing heavily for fiscal stimulus packages to support growth and provide relief for vulnerable groups whilst at the same time, private companies and households may be forced to borrow more to survive the economic impact of COVID-19…..In addition, the economic downturn challenges their capacity to service their existing debts. Therefore, despite widespread concerns about the current escalation of public debt and its sustainability, we should not lose sight of the potential risk from possible surges of private debt…..

Coupled with a weakening economy, already, as late as July 2023, a IMF Report has projected that under its baseline forecast, growth will slow from last year’s 3.5 percent to 3 percent this year and next – a 0.2 percentage points. Our MIDF Research data have maintained its forecast that Malaysia’s GDP growth would moderate at 4.2% in 2023 (2022: 8.7%), weighed down by uninspiring external trade performance as real export of goods is predicted to contract by 2.8% (2022: +11.1), reflecting weakness in regional and global demand.

Furthermore, the national household debt-to-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio had already surged to a new peak of 93.3% as at December 2020 from its previous record high of 87.5% in June 2020, according to Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM).

Malaysia National Government Debt reached 255.4 USD bn in Dec 2023, compared with 246.4 USD bn in the previous quarter. Malaysia Government debt accounted for 64.3 % of the country’s Nominal GDP in Dec 2023, compared with the ratio of 63.8 % in the previous quarter; see csloh, Destined to Debts.

We shall define the Global debt as borrowing by governments, businesses and people. Presently, it is at dangerously high levels. In 2021, global debt reached a record US$303 trillion, a further jump from what was record global debt in 2020 of US$226 trillion, as reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its Global Debt Database,21 Dec 2023.

The IMF Advisory

The IMF must do more to support low-income countries and fragile states, Managing Director  Kristalina Georgieva  said on Tuesday at the Center for Global Development (CGD).

Speaking with Masood Ahmed, CGD President, Georgieva called for the Fund to be more representative of the global economy, with a better balance between advanced economies and the voices of emerging and developing countries. She also expressed the need to help countries build resilience to a more shock-prone world.

Georgieva said she sees two equally important tasks for the Fund: “To ensure that we have the financial capacity to operate, and support vulnerable middle-income countries and low-income countries……And to bring our membership together….Despite all the difficulties in cooperation, we will work towards consensus on those issues on which the future of our children and grandchildren  depend,” Georgieva said. She also explained the IMF’s role in its work on climate.

During a subsequent conversation with World Bank Group President Ajay Banga at an event on support for low-income countries, Georgieva shared more of the Fund’s thinking. For low-income countries to reduce vulnerabilities and achieve a sustainable and meaningful rise in income levels quickly, it will take the countries themselves to do more to build the strength of their economies, and the international community to be a reliable partner, she said.

“We see that those [countries] that are doing better are countries with strong institutions, rule of law, transparency, and less corruption, and building those strengths is something no one but the countries can take on.”

Managing The Debts

Hidden Debt Hurts Economies. Better Disclosure Laws Can Help Ease the Pain. 

Alissa AshcroftKarla VasquezRhoda Weeks-Brown

April 2, 2024

If efforts to address record global public debt are to leave no stone unturned, then weak disclosure laws warrant deep scrutiny. Hidden debt is borrowing for which a government is liable, but which is not disclosed to its citizens or to other creditors. And while this debt—by its nature—is often kept off the official government balance-sheet, it is very real, reaching $1 trillion globally by some estimates.

While these undisclosed obligations are not large when compared to global public debt topping $91 trillion, they pose a growing threat to low-income countries, already highly in debt with annual refinancing needs that have tripled in recent years. The problem is even more pressing amid higher interest rates and weaker economic growth. Accountability, too, is imperiled without accurate information about the extent of borrowing, which heightens the risk of corruption.

These potentially dire consequences can be avoided by strengthening domestic legal frameworks. Our new paper, The Legal Foundations of Public Debt Transparency: Aligning the Law with Good Practices, presents findings from a survey of 60 countries that examined vulnerabilities and loopholes in national laws that hinder transparency.

Building on a July 2023 paper, our new research shows that fewer than half the countries surveyed have laws that require debt management and fiscal reports, while less than a quarter require disclosure of loan-level information—key legal features for facilitating transparency. We also identify four noteworthy vulnerabilities in domestic laws that enable debt to be hidden: a narrow definition of public debt, inadequate legal requirements for disclosure, confidentiality clauses in public debt contracts, and ineffective oversight.

Definition

In many countries, a narrow definition of public debt, in one or in multiple laws, permits some forms of sovereign debt to escape oversight. We recommend that the definition of public debt be broad and comprehensive, meaning that it should capture arrears, derivatives and swaps, suppliers’ credit, and assumptions of guarantees as well as loans and securities. The definition should also cover extra budgetary funds, public trust funds (pension funds, for example), and special purpose vehicles.

A good example is found in Ecuador, which pursued legal reform in 2020 to ensure that short-term financing instruments—such as securities or treasury paper with terms of less than one year—were included in debt calculations and statistics. Other good examples include the legal definitions used in Ghana, Jamaica, Rwanda, Thailand and Vietnam, all of which encompass multiple types of debt instruments.Defining public debt

Disclosure

Second, across the globe, legal requirements for debt disclosure are inadequate. A strong legal basis is crucial to signal that there is a clear requirement to report debt data in a manner that is both timely and relevant for policy analysis, transparency and accountability. Strong reporting laws are found in in Benin, Kenya and Rwanda, which define both public debt reporting requirements and the timeframes for these reports.

Confidentiality

Confidentiality in public debt contracts directly hinders transparency. Across the globe, few laws regulate (and limit) the confidentiality of public debt, which hands policymakers wide discretion to label such contracts confidential for national security or other reasons. This is exacerbated by the fact that current debt-related international standards and guidelines provide limited guidance on how to tackle confidentiality issues.

We recommend that the law tightly define exceptions to disclosure and the scope of confidentiality agreements. Legislative oversight and other safeguard mechanisms such as administrative or judicial remedies should also be spelled out in the applicable legal provisions. Laws in Japan, Moldova and Poland are among the few that authorize legislative or parliamentary oversight of confidential information.

Disclosing public debt

Oversight

The disclosure of public debt may also be inhibited where there is ineffective oversight governance by legislatures and supreme audit institutions (national government audit institutions), which are all important guarantors of accountability. Legislative bodies must be able to monitor and scrutinize public debt on behalf of the people, and they need to have staff able to read and grasp highly technical reports.

Several legislatures have a committee system—such as committees on the budget and public accounts—which allows for specialization among legislators. An example is in the United States, where the Treasury Secretary is required by law to send the annual public debt report not to Congress as a whole, but to two specific committees—House Ways and Means and Senate Finance. We also recommend that laws provide supreme audit institutions with the authority and the necessary powers to monitor and audit government debt and debt operations.

IMF role

Debt transparency not only benefits countries directly, but it is also essential for the work of the IMF. Hidden and otherwise opaque forms of debt make it more difficult for the Fund to fulfill its core mandate in a number of ways. For example, collateralized loans, novel and complex forms of financing, and confidentiality agreements make it difficult for the IMF to accurately assess a country’s debt and help bring its economy back on track.

Thus, the Fund works to bring the benefits of debt transparency to countries directly through technical assistance and also addresses the issue in our program engagements.

Well-designed laws make it harder to hide debt. But there are not enough of these laws on the books, despite their demonstrated benefits. Given the critical importance of getting transparency right, countries and their international partners must push for reforms to improve domestic legal frameworks, which in turn benefits both borrowers, legitimate creditors, and the system more broadly. Turning stones has never been more important.

— Kika Alex-Okoh contributed to this blog.

ADDENDUM
By way of confronting China with the peak paradigm by dispelling “Peak China” myths and affirming China’s development trajectory (john ross; Habib al Badawi; the diplomat; CfR; The East is Rising, the West is Declining {东升西降}) is much a discourse that China only wants to export its labour, that China only wants to grab the world’s resources, etc., and is engaged in debt diplomacy suppressing emerging economies in their development endeavours. The Johns Hopkins University’s China-Africa Research Initiative website has exceedingly valuable statistics and reports and blogs about this matter; this site also has a discussion on the China Trap Diplomacy whereas PRC firms are being told to reduce their financial exposures in overseas jurisdictions that could move to seize assets; and there is a good roadmap since the seizures of Russian assets after the invasion of Ukraine; read  Counter Sanction Strategies that China Can Learn from Russia, Ding Yifan; Countering Western Sanctions, Yi Yan.
Looking at the chart below:
This chart actually plots Chinese credit, so it’s the debt of the rest of the world, the developing world, to China. And the chart on the left simply indicates the way in which debt owed to China has, of course, increased over the course of time as a result of Chinese development assistance and China’s lending, especially to parts of the Global South; read RISE OF CHINA AND DEMISE OF CAPITALIST WORLD ECONOMY.
One of the very striking things about China is that a large share of its lending is, in fact, to very low income countries. It lends more to the least developed countries in the world than do the multilateral institutions and do the OECD group.
If you see the least developed countries, their total debt to the rest of the world is 43% of their gross national income, which is, nearly one half, a very substantial share. Of that debt, the share owed to China is only 5.5%. And Chinese debt amounts to 12.8% of the total.
China’s share of GNI is 4.3%, and its share of the total debt of sub-Saharan Africa is 10%. So these claims about a debt trap are, in a sense, simply do not stand up empirically.

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On depreciating ringgit deteriorating balance of payments in degrowing state of an economy

PROLOGUE

Malaysian ringgit’s fall has puts the central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) on alert. The Country is ‘ready’ to intervene after its currency hits lowest level since the Asian financial crisis.

The beleaguered Malaysian ringgit is testing levels not seen since the depths of the Asian financial crisis more than a quarter century ago, causing officials to step up their rhetoric to try and stem the slide. With U.S. interest rates at a 23-year high, capital has fled Malaysia as investors seek better returns elsewhere. They expect the Fed to start lowering its benchmark rate in June, as U.S. policymakers seek more evidence that inflation is firmly on a downward path before cutting rates. Fed Chairman Jerome Powell told the Senate Banking Committee on Thursday that U.S. monetary authorities were “not far” from having sufficient confidence in falling inflation to start reducing rates. The central bank has repeatedly attributed the fall in the currency to external factors, including U.S. interest rates and an uncertain Chinese economic outlook. The ringgit is undervalued, authorities say, and does not reflect the country’s positive economic prospects. As an export-driven country, a weaker currency would typically benefit the economy. But that also means higher costs for importers, raising prices of goods and services.
Source: Nikkei Asia

Malaysia used to run a current account surplus, which means that the country is earning more foreign exchange from goods and services exported than it is spending on imports owing to the then often strong shipments of electrical and electronic products. However, the current-account surplus, has
narrowed in 2023 to 1.3% of gross domestic product, the lowest in more than a decade, amid portfolio outflows as investors and traders scrambled out when the ringgit weakens.

Indeed, Malaysia’s current account (CA) surplus in the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2023 dropped to RM300 million or 0.1 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) on wider deficit in primary account due to larger outflows in investment income. As a comparison, in 2022, Malaysia’s trade surplus amounted to around 58.16 billion U.S. dollars.

Secondly, the financial account defici shall persist owing to external  “structural reasons” amid the higher-for-longer US interest rates; this aspect is part of the larger spectrum of the neo-liberalism-is-imperialism  discourse.

Since the Bretton Woods Agreements  were adopted, the construction of an international monetary order is centered on the U.S. dollar. Other currencies were to be pegged to the US dollar which was at one time pegged to gold.

The U.S. dollar thus plays the prominent role in world currency, while replacing the British sterling pound but designating the U.S. a special position compared to the rest of the world. Henceforth, U.S. dollar at one time makes up 70 percent of global currency reserves, accounting for 68 percent of international trade settlements, 80 percent of foreign exchange transactions, and 90 percent of international banking transactions. Owing to this financial dominance, the U.S. dollar becomes the internationally recognized reserve currency and trade settlement currency. Therefore, not only the United States is able to exchange it for real commodities, resources, and labour, and thus to cover its long-term trade deficit and fiscal deficit, but she can also make cross-border investments, mergers and acquisitions of enterprises using U.S. dollars.

In a sense, the U.S. dollar hegemony provides one good example of the predatory nature of neoimperialism. The United States can also obtain international seigniorage by exporting U.S. dollars. She can reduce its foreign debt by depreciating the U.S. dollar or assets that are priced in U.S. dollars. The hegemony of the U.S. dollar has also caused the transfer of wealth from debtor countries to creditor countries. This would, in fact, mean that poor countries would indirectly subsidise the rich metropolitan Global North countries.

As it is, much higher interest rates – due to Western central banks – are suffocating developing nations, especially the poorest, causing prolonged debt distress and economic stagnation, (KS Jomo, March 2024).

[ The comprehensive threads on the Financialisation of Neo-imperialism are covered extensively in these sites: HERE1; HERE2; HERE3; HERE4 and HERE5). ]


Thirdly, the negative spread of the ringgit over US dollar interest rates, for the first time in history, has inevitably reduced the buffer Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) local markets have against a rather heightened global market volatility.

The uncertainties racking worldwide under a post-Covid pandemic are geopolitical situations: the Russo-Ukrainian special military operation, the wider MENA Hamas-Israel war, the deglobalisation-is-gaining-momentum effect on Geoeconomics of the two major economies in China and the USA, especially from heightened U.S. interest rates and an uncertain Chinese economic outlook. 

Worsen by the fact that Malaysia’s largest trading partners are China, Singapore, Europe and US, where around 80% of the nation’s exports and imports are in the greenback US$. In reality, only between 4% and 5% of Malaysian trade are conducted in the ringgit.


Fourthly, and more vitally, there is a slow and policy implementation process to call GLCs (government-linked companies) and GLICs (government-linked investment companies) to repatriate their overseas earnings and begin to adopt an economic nationalism ethos by converting them into ringgit towards supporting the national currency. Indeed, “If implemented effectively, these gains could be significant,” according to ANZ Research. “Not only is Malaysia a net creditor economy, the stock of such non-reserve external assets is significant.”

The country’s GLICs have a total assets worth RM$1.84 trillion which is almost equal to the size of Malaysia’s nominal gross domestic product (GDP) this year.

Indeed, though PMX Anwar has mandated GLICs to increase their respective domestic direct investments, saying they have a responsibility to work together with the Madani government in ensuring economic growth and ensuing rakyat²  expanding income instead of investing abroad, it will be some times to forsee any gradual repatriation of national funds and assets to homeland, (malaymail, 9/01/2024).

On another GLIC case instance, the Employees Provident Fund as at end June 2021, its investment assets stood at RM989.14 billion, of which 37% was invested overseas. By the Q3 2023, the EPF’s overseas investments generated RM$6.55 billion, or 45%, of its total investment income recorded, (kwsp.gov, December 2023).

During a 2024 dividends payment presentation on the 2023 EPF performance, it was stated that some 62% of the EPF’s RM$1.136 trillion investment assets are invested domestically, generating RM$31.71 billion, or 47% of total investment income. Global assets — which include those US tech stocks that boosted shariah dividends — generated RM$35.28 billion, or 53% of total investment income, while making up only 38% of investment assets in 2023, (theedgemalaysia 17/03/2024). This could be or might be attributed to the ringgit’s weakened performance that had boosted such abnormality returns.

Fifth, present economy scenario is compounded by contrary to net foreign inflow of RM$6.1 billion in Malaysian equities year-to-date, the local bond market recorded net foreign outflow of RM$3.23 billion. Heightened uncertainty and tightening global financial conditions have contributed to portfolio outflows from domestic bond markets and reduced inflows into the equity market in recent months.

Indeed, country’s revenue is not rising as fast as the increase in operating expenditure that is more than 95% of revenue since 2008

In fact, from past records and datasets,  total government debt and liabilities as of June 2022 was estimated to be at RM$1.42 trillion and  would rise even further by the following year. Total debt and liabilities were then about 82 per cent of GDP.

When one was assuming the national economy destined to expand by 7.5% in nominal terms during year 2021 to RM$1,521.3bil, Malaysia’s official debt to GDP and  total  debt to GDP was then expected to be 64.1% and  77.9%, respectively, but it would not be so pulsating by year 2023 under an uncharted and rather unfriendly territory.

Historically, by 2022, it was already assessed that likely, there shall be  many Uncertainties in Malaysia’s Economic Recovery, Cassey Lee, ISEAS, Singapore, 19/05/2022.

The sixth problematic measure policymakers should be focusing upon is to deal with the more persistent selling pressure. This process is to encourage exporters to convert their  foreign currency proceeds on reversible basis with Bank Negara Malaysia to shore up the central bank’s reserves, rather than these values being a hold-up in foreign vaults.

Malaysia’s international reserve assets amounted to US$112.94 billion (RM$523 billion) in mid-2023, while other foreign currency assets stood at US$1.7 million, according to Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), in 29 Aug 2023. However, the international reserves of Bank Negara Malaysia amounted to USD114. 3 billion as at 29 February 2024. The reserves position is sufficient to finance 5.4 months of imports of goods and services, but is only 1.0 times of the total short-term external debt.

It is also an era when odious outshore transferrence of wealth generated in the country that have had looted and leaked out, (icij January 2024). A Malaysian politician under the Pandora Papers probe linked to US$52 million offshore trust and UK, US property investments – in fact, nearly half of the international reserves of Bank Negara Malaysia.

A final, and finer, point rests upon micromanaging a process whereby Bank Negara Malaysia shall and should initiate a guideline or program on how to short-date onshore interest rates not only to be higher but in a calibrated way, too, and possibly also in a reversible manner.

All these approaches should be part and parcel of the MADANI ECONOMY to be SIRED in serving rakyat²  to be well-served towards  maintaining economic development sustainability.

3] The Degrowth

The spiraling cost of living associated with a depreciated ringgit resulting in a poorer balance of payments is but a cumulation of other factors:

A) Malaysia with the promotion of an equity ownership, a majority of foreign direct invesrments (FDIs) enjoys the liberalised condition of 100 percent ownership subjected to 80 percent or more of their production that are assembled for exports. Though at one time, the net flow of long-term capital account was encouraging, lately, the country’s export-led industry from the manufacturing sector had been lack-lustre due to a pre-matured de-industrialisation during the 1990s, and confronted by the Asian Financial Crisis that caused Malaysia’s GDP to shrink from US$100.8 billion in 1996 to US$72.2 billion in 1998. The Malaysian economy’s GDP did not recover to 1996 levels until 2003.

Malaysia’s full-year economic growth is expected to be at 3.8% in 2023, below the government’s projection of a 4% expansion and a sharp drop from a 22-year high of 8.7% in 2022.

B) The other major challenges facing the nation is a deficiency of a national platform with a defined visionary objective (and a governance mechanism and or organisational structure) in the present program of industrialisation with the Industry 4.0 Initiative and related programs, structures and approaches.  Consequentially, the standards of Industry 4.0 related equipment, technologies and systems are regarded as ill-defined in conception and fuzzy in design and development, (STORM 2023, Industry Initiative 4.0).

The increasing FDIs, especially from China, are but blips if the skilled labour ecosystem is not enhanced to handle high-technology and high-value production processes sooner the better to hinge on a leading competitive edge over rival ASEAN countries.

According to the World Investment Report 2023, US$223.307 billion in FDIs flowed into Asean in 2022 — the highest since 2010 and an increase of 27.44% from 2021, with the US being ASEAN’s largest FDI investor with US$40.2 billion worth of FDI in 2021, representing 22.5 percent of total FDI flowing into ASEAN.

TA Securities expects the sentiment of the semiconductor sector in Malaysia to improve gradually, underpinned by an anticipated recovery in global demand as well as increasing trade diversion opportunities as a result of the China Plus One strategy.

The China Plus One Strategy, also known as Plus One or C+1, is a supply chain strategy that encourages companies to minimise their supply chain dependency on China by diversifying the countries they source parts from. It is about leveraging the strengths of multiple hubs to build a more resilient, agile, and cost-effective supply chain. An example shall say, include investments to build a chip-testing and packaging factory in Malaysia, a mines-to-manufacturing electric vehicle supply chain in Indonesia, and an expansion of consumer electronics production facilities in Vietnam.

C) We still have the issue of economic nationalism which is still pervading the nation, after more than 65 years of ethnocapital-ethnocratic-clientel-capitalism reinforcement, there is not much to show except as a development of underdevelopment-under-monopoly-capitalism. The relationship between economic growth and ethnic diversity (Agostini et al., 2010, Gören, 2014,  Iniguez-Montiel, 2014) is grounded in compendium of economic literature that finds that ethnic heterogeneity does induce social conflicts and violence, which in turn, could affect economic growth, too (see  Easterly and Levine, 1997Mauro, 1995Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). The negative consequences of such ethnic diversity imply that unless adequate and appropriate policies are executed to ensure that the benefits of any economic growth are equally shared among all ethnic groups, otherwise economic development, and consequent economic growth are impaired. The glaring fact that despite many Kongress Economik Bumiputera (KEB), these conventions have only dragged the nation further into sovereign indebtness, underdevelopment in many states, and whereby the acuteness of poverty is even sharpened and much wider as reflected in the EPF’S saving ratios where the top 20% (T20) of EPF members possess 82.5% of the total savings, but the

The continuing in-depth studies by Gomezwith  Jomo and Lim Mah Hui – collectively critical of  selective privatisation and bumiputera equity quotas, and in the promotion of money politics that are dastardly detrimental to national economic development; view GOMEZ affirmative policy @UN University, and read also  the  50 years NEP hasn’t worked and the various articles in NLM#10 only portent more problens in the implementation of the Madani Economic Model (MEM) where there are major disagreements on the MEM principles that have stretched from the theological aspect within a secular society (BakriTajuddinHunter) with an uncertain economic Islamic impact upon non-muslims (IgnatiusRamakrishnan; Ignatius2), to the complications of managing complexity in economic developmental execution (UNICEFWorld Bank, 2022; and World Bank, 2019);  STORMRamesh Chander, Murray Hunter, and Lim Teck Ghee) while trying to achieve a post-ABIM script (Mohktar).

D) Whereupon the poor and underclass have a bleak future because the upper class is well-entrenched…..

Those attending the Bumiputra Congress come from the upper class.”

Indeed, the recent 7th edition of KEB is no more than a gathering of bumiputera elites to enlarge and extended opportunities for themselves and their peer cronies.

Much pre-determined is that this congressional conference will be beneficial to the GLCs, and their crony contractors and collaborators,(Hunter 2024; see also The 3 things we learnt from KEB, Syed Jaymal Zahiid).

In a post-colonial society, the capitalist class in charge of the state-directed capitalism is termed the ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ and would comprise  bureaucrats businessmen, leading politicians and professionals; where membership of such a class is determined by the control over or closeness with the state apparatus, overtly or covertly, (Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, “Development in the post-Colonial State: Class, Capitalism and the Islamist Political Alternative in Malaysia“, Kajian Malaysia, Jld. XVIL No.2, Disember 1999).

E) In an eastasia forum  (EAF) posting, there is an editorial piece on Malaysia’s economic reform still caught in the baggage of the old politics, published 29 January 2024 by the Australia National University.

Our analysis is that the present strategy of brokering access to state power in exchange for loyalty has led to slower progress on economic and democratic reforms, leaving Malaysia’s issues of socioeconomic inequality and middle-income issues unresolved, (refer to STORM 2024 , a trunkful of dirty linens)

  • In NEP-inequality-ethnocractic-hegemony, we have elaborated upon not only on the inequity application of the National Economic Policy ( newleftmalaysia
  • Ethnic Inequality and Poverty, but the finance monopoly capitalism  residence in the national economy that retarded our economic performance in comparison to other southeast Asian countries. The other weak policy articulation includes the acceptance of neoliberalism-is-neo-imperialism as the developmental model so much so that the country incurred  indebtness  through-and-by-neoimperialism with the unhealthy involvement of IMF / World Bank intruding into emerging and developing economies, (see IMF on Malaysia). The resultant outcome is poverty debts and inequality spreading into the urban sector where three-fourths of Malaysians reside. The UNICEF 2020 Report has shown that low income female-headed households are exceptionally vulnerable. World Bank advocating of high growth rate only aggravate an economic situation encouraged and encrouched by monopoly-capital, especially since the  continuance of neo-colonialism  post-independence and in furtherance the  penetration of neoimperialism onto Malaysia in the form of financialization capitalism.
  • With the advent and advancement in the financial liberalization process, finance capital is thus no longer just serving industrial capital, but has far overtaken it. The financial oligarchs and capital rentiers are in dominance; more so, with an ethnocapital insertion, and an assertion, in the govertmenr link-companies and the national banking sector; see STORM, April 2021Class analysis of banks and corporate capital; to read also,  Colonialism, Capital and Class {forthcoming}.

EPILOGUE

When inflation is high, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) will set about undoing these actions by tightening monetary policy, and markets will make you pay with higher bond yields. Boost the economy with borrowed money, and you will see the gains clawed back by higher interest rates. The resulting economic contraction and inflation will erase whatever economic gains through “freebies and free lunches” through subsidies.

Always remembering that subsidies stimulus is a class war waged against the 99 per cent by the elite 1 per cent. Often the money extracted from the working class through inflation is transferred to the rich as subsidies and tax cuts to promote capital accumulation.


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Capitalism collusion in ecological extinction

1 INTRODUCTION

In an early essay, it preambled as In reality, Global North monopoly-capital investment in Global South is little more than a collaborating strategy for profiting on planetary destruction.

Lynas Corporation – the Australian entity – is operating the world’s largest rare earth extraction plant with a planned capacity of 22,000 tonnes per annum in Gebeng (Lynas Corporation, Annual Report 2011), near to the half a million populated Kuantan metropolitan township in the east coastal plain of Peninsular Malaysia. Lynas Corporation entry into this holiday resort town with pristine beaches facing the South China Sea is backed by the state government of Pahang of which Kuantan is the capital city.

The Corporation had claimed that its US$800 million Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (LAMP) is not a threat to public health because the raw material that would be shipped from Mount Weld in Western Australia to be processed in Gebeng shall emit very low levels of radioactivity. Further, it had also claimed that the wastes generated could be processed and disposed of safely; and that the economic benefits to Malaysia generated by the rare earth extraction plant would be substantial, too.

2 LYNAS RARE REALITIES

This miner entity continues to be keen to expand its investments in Malaysia during a sideline to the Review and Future Direction of Asean-Australia Dialogue Relations at the recent Asean-Australia Special Summit held in Melbourne when RM$24.5 billion investments in Malaysia will be from Australian companies.

It comes at a time when under a new permit, Lynas will only be able to continue other parts of processing until March 2026, after Lynas’ initial plan for permanent radioactive waste dump was rejected, (Green Left). Lynas had applied to Malaysia’s regulator for the conditions to be removed because they “represent a significant variation from the conditions under which… Lynas made the initial decision to invest in Malaysia,” it had said.

After a long-running battle, the Malaysian government in October 2024 overturned its ban on Lynas importing and processing a crucial substance which generates low-level radioactive residue at its refinery in Kuantan, Pahang.

It is also an appropriate moment when merger talks with her US rival, MP Materials collapsed last month. Lynas acknowledges to a long-standing attraction to the California’s Mountain Pass rare earths mine as owned by MP Materials. To Lynas, the refinery experience and expertise of a premier Australian company is to continue looking for an offer to any well-capitalised competitor in an allied economy.

On another aspect, Lynas also has to focus on the industry competitiveness in every activity to gain every opportunity to challenge China’s dominance in the rare earths market-sphere, especially during a period where both Lynas and MP Materials have  suffered weaker prices over the past 12 months.

Lynas Rare Earths managing director Amanda Lacaze was quoted “We have always said very clearly that the best thing for our business is a really robust and vigorous and energised outside China industry,” she said last week, after Lynas handed down its first-half result, (Financial Review, March 4, 2024).

Despite the fact that Lynas has had once  its US government funding more than doubled when the Biden administration accelerates its mission to secure supplies of rare earths as part of its National Security Project). And that even the US Defence Department assisted by contributing $US258 million (A$384 million) toward the construction of Lynas’ heavy rare earths refinery in Texas, up from the initial pledge of $US120 million in June 2022, (Financial Review), the Western powers are loosing the competitive edge to China on the mining and production processes where dominance has been achieved through decades of state investment and export controls, (OxfordEnergy; Investigate Europe).

Therefore, it is not unexpected that Lynas shall return to the Malaysian shore vigorously. Further, by continuing an imperfect production process shall only induce more ecological extinction of flora and fauna – besides unhealthy harm to communities – in our presently pleasant and pristine homeland.

3 MARX AND LYNAS MALAYSIA

It shall be a combination of unhealthy effect upon the communities and the uncertainty of commercial impact on the local economy once the Lynas processing plant ramps up its operation again.

Marx and Engels understood that the relationship between man and nature is one of interdependence as opposed to domination. This interdependence relates to Marx’s Metabolic Rift theory which is expanded by Foster (1999) where the dynamics between humans and non-humans in the natural world are distinct entities but are united within one metabolic system. In this metabolic system, energy is transferred and the rift –  capitalism – inefficiently takes energy to turn into a monetary capitalistic expansion.

Since the accumulation of capital is paramount to the owners of capital, their prime objective is to obtain their returns of investment within a short period so they can accumulate profits faster. As a result, investors do not consider long term impacts of their actions on the environment nor the biosphere.

In Anti-DuhringEngels had written that

For Marx and Engels, the materialist conception of nature and the materialist conception of history were reflexively connected, just as the alienation of nature and the alienation of labour were.

It is in this context that Marx’s central concepts of the “universal metabolism of nature,” “social metabolism,” and the metabolic “rift” have come to define his critical-ecological worldview, (Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 3, London: Penguin, 1981), 949; Marx and Engels,  Collected Works, vol. 30, 54–66).

To be clear, the by-product of the rare earth wastes produced will be in huge amounts of radioactive material such as thorium and uranium. These elements will be a grave threat to health depending on the “dose-response relationship” (that is, the greater the exposure to ionizing radiation, the greater the damage to the human body) that depends upon exposure to unnecessary radiation. It has also be emphatically stated, too, that the methods of waste processing and disposal as proposed initially by Lynas Corporation were unsafe and socially irresponsible, see LYNASRARE.


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Financialisation capitalism impact upon national economy

first posted on 23/04/2023

[Additional embedded referenced-sources on 18/2/24]

1] INTRODUCTION

By financialization capitalism we shall mean an emerging form of capitalism that increasingly uses finance, and apply financial tools and means, in the operations of capitalism (John Bellamy Foster, The Financialization of Accumulation, Monthly Review vol:62, issue 05 October 2010), or simply as the financialization of the accumulation of capital process (Paul Sweezy, “More (or Less) on Globalization,”   Monthly Review 49, no: 4 (September 1997). 

The defining process of accumulation in financial capital would involve the investment of money or any financial asset to increase the initial monetary value of said asset as a financial return whether in the form of profit, rent, interest, royalties or capital gains.

This shift in economic activity from production, and in the service sector, to financial activities that generate high private rewards disproportionate to their social productivity (as stated by James Tobin, Nobel Prize in Economics 1981) is one central aspect whereby the surplus value, that is, the added value created by workers in excess of their own labour-cost is being appropriated by the new financial capitalists as profits, (MarxThe Capital, chapter 8). This surplus value as the source of society’s accumulation of fund or investment of fund, part of is re-invested, but part of it appropriated as personal income, and used for consumption purposes by the owners of capital assets. The workers cannot capture this benefit directly because they have no claim to the means of financial creation or its final production.

2] MONOPOLY-FINANCE CAPITALISATION

The creation of monopoly-finance capitals in the neoliberalism economy of Malaysia is no more than the hegemonic economic ideology in neoliberalism-is-neo-imperialism of the Thatcher and Reagan regimes reflecting the new imperatives of capital – especially by advancing IT-geared financial globalization planted in Malaysia as the engine of financialization capitalism model (Lena Rethel,   Malaysian Capitalism, Rents, and Financialisation, University of Southampton, 2010; STORM April 2023, the financialization of capitalist system; csloh 2022, Concentration of Capital), whence increasingly, that specific

In the early 1990s, Malaysia corporations used to seek funds from the domestic equity market while non-financial enterprises relied on bank debt and the issuance of bonds abroad. Since 2003, however, the corporate bond market has reached an unprecedented size of RM$190 billion, while similarly since 1999 the total private sector bonds outstanding have surpassed that of public sector bonds (Bank Negara, 2007).

This expansion of bond finance favours bigger corporations linked to the government – much to the disadvantage of the Chinese and Indian capitals’ SMEs (the small and medium-sized enterprises) that do not have the sizeable funding resources, though presently, 98.5% out of the total 49101 establishments in Malaysia manufacturing sector are SMEs whilst the rest of 1403 companies are large firms, majority are the transnational corporations (TNCs); see  STORM 2023, Industry 4.0 Initiative; STORM 2021, TNCs’ labour exploitation.

The ensuing financialization of Malaysian capitalism led to the emergence of a new politics of debts, and it also coincides with rising levels of household indebtedness (Geneva Graduate Institute, Global Challenges, issue 12, November 2022), globally reconfiguring society where share ownership and shareholder value take preeminence, a growing influence from capital market-based financial system, the further entrenchment of the political renter class power as well as the polarization of wealth and income – wealthy rich and poverty poors – especially with the explosion of financial innovation and trading that led an economy more towards “speculation” than the engenderment of production to be equally shared by rakyat (see Costa Lapavitsas, “The financialization of capitalism”, SOAS abstract).

The above processes occurred when the existing relationship between the various forms of capital rent-seekers collude. Under the New Economic Policy (NEP) with state capitalism this process only accentuated with increased financialization, reinforcing the existing strand of an ethnically divided capitalism (Searle 1999,  Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism, Asian Studies Association of Australia). The country’s economic initiative was to be in alliance with the private sector, especially while in collaboration with Chinese capitals during the early 1980s, was also evidently prominent in the collusion of the privatization of state assets at that period, (Heng Pek Koon, The New Economic Policy and the Chinese Community in Peninsular MalaysiaThe Developing Economics, 1997).

Whereas the majority of businesses built during the prewar period were found in the tin and rubber industries that comprised illustrious family firms built by Low Yat, Loke Yew, Chong Yoke Choy, H.S, Lee, Tan Chay Yan and Lau Pak Khuan who colluded with imperial British plantation interests to build their empires, the “new money-capital” entities like YTL Corp’s Yeoh Tiong Lay, Berjaya’s Vincent Tan, Genting’s Lim Goh Tong, Sunway’s Jeffrey Cheah, Lion’s William Cheng and the Ananda Krishnan groups and business stables attempted the forging of more Sino-Indo-Malay corporations, that is, a co-opetition strategy whereby Chinese and Indian capitals can compete as well as co-operate with Malay interests, (see Neo Yee Pan “The Role of Chinese Business in the Context of Our National Objective” paper delivered at the MCA Economic Congress, March 3rd. 1974; Jesudason 1989,  Ethnicity and the Economy: the State, Chinese Business, and Multinationals in Malaysia, Oxford University Press, Singapore; Heng,  op.cit.).

Those Chinese capitals and Indian compradors would, by forming joint ventures with Malay capitals, tap upon the vast capital resources of State agencies such as PERNAS, PNB and Peremba Bhd, besides

  1. UMNO-controlled corporations like the Fleet Group and Media Prima
  2. Institutional funds such as Lembaga Urusan Tabung Haji (LUTH or Islamic Pilgrims Management and Funds Board) and Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (Armed Forces Funds Board)
  3. Private sector capital held by new class of Malay millionaires such as Tun Daim Zainuddin, Tun Sri Azman Hashim, Tan Sri Wan Hamzah and Tun Sri Rashid Hussein
  4. Royal entrepreneurs like Tunku Imran ibni Tuanku Ja’afar of Negeri Sembilan and Sultan Ibrahim Iskandar of Johore whose latter’s wealth estimated by Bloomberg is a conservative worth around US$5.7 billion, and the royal family’s due US$1.1 billion investment portfolio, which includes US$105 million worth of investments in public companies, US$483 million worth of investments in other private companies, and various real-estate projects.

Then, one has to look at the ordinary category of depositors who are redefined as fee-paying consumers of financial products such as car and motor-cycle hire-purchase loans and credit cards payment to consumer products besides those remitting housing mortgages.

Thus, in 2005, the ratio of total household debt to GDP amounted to 72.6%, of which nearly 85% was provided by banks (Bank Negara Annual Report 2006), and that between 1999 and 2006, total Malaysian household debt grew at an annualized rate of 15%. From a base in 2000 over RM$160 billion in household debt, this amount had risen over a short period to nearly RM$400 billion by 2006.

Consequently, the national domestic and external debt, between 1991 and 2011 soared:

What is beginning to happen is that compared to the NEP period, between 1970-1980, the bank-based development state model was that the consumption needs of households had been subordinated to the financing needs of the industrial sector as well as the ethnic-based distributive policy, that is the NEP, whereas post-economic downturn 1980s had seen private consumption (and thus household borrowing) is increasingly seen as the important driver of domestic growth. This also means that bank lending is much about sustaining consumption than that of production.

The fifth point is that the passing of the buck-ringgit, so to speak, is the “individualization of risk” had meant a high incidence of household debts arising from marketed consumption patterns whereby April 2006 the Credit Counseling and Debt Management Agency (AKPK) has to be established as part of the government approach – to develop a personalised debt repayment plan in consultation with financial service providers – to confront the ever increasing consumer debt that was primary affecting many in the Malay (youthful) community. Unfortunately, AKPK had often portrayed these debtors as “innocent victims of circumstances” or as “hapless” or being “foolish” whereas the main underlying and real reason is that the rising household debt owes too much  kleptocratic capitalistic instinct to empower capitalism, and more recently the  financialisation of capitalism by ethnocapital rentiers – whether enticing youths to possess new versions of motorcycles or a variety of credit-cards.

By March 2016, more than 148,000 borrowers have joined the debt management programme conducted by AKPK (Malaysian Reserve, May 25th. 2016).

Finally, public interest rates were driven to very low rate to enable such banks to make secure guaranteed profits by lending to their customers and households at higher rates. In short, the financialization of Malaysian capitalism had only encouraged public funds being injected into private and kleptocratic banks to boost capital and enlarge capital formation, and further where this public liquidity was to enable these banks to sustain their continuous siphoning operations.

Therein highlights the contradictions of poverty and inequality within society.

The other key point is that the rise of a ‘mass investment culture’ has strengthened the ‘dominance of finance capital’ (Harmes 2001Mass investment culture?New Left Review, 9, pp 103-24), and is a contributing trend in the financialization of capitalism in Malaysia today, too. Take as an example, PNB has also nowadays invests in bonds and structured instruments, thus assisting in the reproduction of a sustainable capital market-based financial system – a collateral vulnerabilities of increasing individual exposure to the capital market whereby inevitably “households had become financialized, too” (Costas LapavitsasFinancialised Capitalism: Crisis and Financial ExpropriationHistorical Materialism 17 (2009), School of Oriental and African Studies, London).

In effect, the evolution of unit trust investment, on one side though deviating from NEP redistributive schemes, has on the other hand, turns the capital markets as part of social policymaking, too. By October 2008, the ruling regime borrowed RM$5 billion to shore up the credit-crunch-affected equity market, with the money provided by EPF but disbursed by Khazanah jointly owned by EPF, PNB and Khazanah itself.

Thirdly, this shore up of government interests (not dissimilar to crony capitalism in the early stage of the NEP implementation during the 1970s) that only act as a political behaviour to protect the up-and-coming Malay middle class (Embong, State-led Modernisation and the New Middle Class in Malaysia) and the Barisan Nasional clientel, but also as a conduit on preserving the wellbeing of the capital market so as to be used to bail out Malaysian corporations and favoured individual capitalists.

As the state’s role was being transformed to meet the new imperatives of financialization, the kleptocratic governance had to assume as lender of last resort–bailing out crony capitalists like Malaysian Airline System’s  Tajudin and Halim Saad’s United Engineers Malaysia (UEM) and the Renong Group (the largest bumiputera-owned conglomerate then) when in August 2001, Syarikat Danasaham – the wholly subsidiary of state-owned investment house Khazanah Nasional – made a conditional voluntary offer to purchase the entire shares and warrants of UEM, including Renong’s stake.

Lastly, PNB evolution from changing state investment practices to assume increasingly a role as ‘market players’ where the investment strategy has become more neoliberal following financial considerations on return-oriented basis, there is a competitive stance in maintaining, and retaining, share of the market than that of a distributive expression as articulated within the 1970s’ NEP objectives. It started as a state investment vehicle to strip off government assets for private Bumiputera interest. Using these ill-gotten funds, by 1981, PNB has had became one of the leading Bumiputera investment institutions acquiring RM$487 million shares in 60-odd companies.

3] ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REVISIONISM

With this expanded capital base, the 1980s economic development revisionism only contributed to the seedling of fund that eventually induced the introduction of financialization capitalism in the country. For example, PNB has together with Khazanah, implicated in the launch of the “transformation programme for government-linked companies”. For instance, Pemandu (Performance Management Delivery Unit) was set up under the Prime Minister Department on Sept 16, 2009 to oversee the implementation of the Economic Transformation Programme (ETP) and the Government Transformation Programme (GTP), the two key pillars of the government’s New Economic Model (NEM) introduced in 2010.

Secondly, the reforms heralded by Prime Minister Najib in 2009 and implemented by Idris Jala, Minister in the PM’s Department heading the Performance Management and Delivery Unit (Pemandu) have been lackluster, and not as successful in their implementation as often propogated (Research for Social Advancement (REFSA)A Critique of the ETP, Part I and Part II, January 2012). According to other analyses of the 12 national key economic areas that Pemandu targeted upon, they averaged lower gross national income growth than non-key sectors between 2011 and 2014 at 4.99 percent against a national average at 8.77 percent.

These state-funded vehicles, instead of overseeing the New Economic Model progress, have willingly driven public funds being routed into the banking system to boost capital. With the availability of ready liquidity of public fund, the consolidated domestic banks nowadays are able to more than sustain their profitable operations.

The third pointer is that public interest rates – by which the central bank in hoarding  dollar reserves, Bank Negara is able to “sterilize the reserves” – are being driven down to enable the banking system to make secured profits by lending to their clienteles at higher rates.

4] GROWTH OF FINANCIALISATION OF WORLD ECONOMY lies in the deeper imperial penetration into underdeveloped economies with wider financial dependence, (see Magdoff 1978,   Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to the Present  and Magdoff, 1969, The Age of Imperialism; also refer to Foster “The New Imperialism of Globalized Monopoly-Finance Capital – An Introduction”,  Monthly Review, Vol:67, Issue 03), like in Brazil and Venezuela where the domination of global monopoly-finance capital has attracted portfolio investment, and to pay off its external debts to international capital, including the IMF that accrued high interest rates, de-industrialization, a slow growth in its economy, and the continuance vulnerability to the often rapid movements of global finance (IMFWorld Economic Outlook, 2015; csloh, destined-to-debts; ks jomo, IMF-deepening-world-stagnation; csloh, debt-crisis-threatening-Global-South).

The daily average volume of foreign exchange transactions, even from old data set had indicated the magnitude the seriousness and depth of neo-imperial financialization penetration: US$570 billion (1989) had increased to US$2.7 trillion by 2006, and US$5.7 trillion in 2013 (Bank of International Settlements, various reports). Therefore, the agglomeration of wealth, and its continuous transferring across the globe, had pointed to the increasingly related to finance transactions than the physical material mode of production. It also indicative in some ways through transfer-pricing by trans-national corporations (TNCs) that there is a constant leaking of investment fund from Malaysia, and there is consultancy advisory on how to minimize it (see Juliana Tan Ming Qing, Malaysia: Transfer pricing aspects of restructuring, KPMG 2014; Bob Kee and Mei Seen Chang,  Malaysia: Malaysia’s evolving transfer pricing landscape, KPMG 2014).

Rich countries has had drained US$152Trillion from the Global South since 1960.

Imperialism never ended, it just changed form.

5] THE FINANCIAL SUPERSTRUCTURE  STRANGLING HOMEOWNERS

The financial superstructure’s demand for new cash infusions to keep speculative financial derivatives expanding (see Foster “The Financialization of Capitalism”, op.cit.), has meant that it encourages homeowners to maintain their lifestyles even with stagnant real wages that are causing the Malaysia’s household debts being the highest in Asia – as at August 2015, the country’s household debt-to-GDP ratio stood as high as 88.1% (The Edge  22/02/2016; by March 2016, the total household debt in Malaysia stood at 89% of the Gross Domestic Product or RM$1 trillion, consisting 80% from the banking system, with 20% from non-banking financial institutions,  Malaysian Reserve, 26th. May 2016); whereas, collectively, the 9 richest men in Malaysia have a total capital asset of RM$175 billion (Forbes 2016).

Existing data have also signified that the rapid increase in inequality have become built-in necessities of the monopoly-finance capital phase in the neo-imperialism system. The wealth gap among Malay Malaysians has grown larger significantly with the Gini Coefficient among the bumiputeras having the highest inequality (Hwok-Aun Lee and Muhammad Abdul Khalid, Is inequality in Malaysia really going down?, Faculty of Economics Administration Working paper 2014/09, University of Malaya).

This is duly noted by the  Khalid research paper at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where presented, the disparity among the Malay community – the top 1% – is much acute, and accentuated as ever.

After six and half decades of sustained  neoliberalism economic developmental  effort, the nation of Malaysia is still as disparity in absolute income inequality as ever, (see lower right chart below)

SourcesWorld Bank datasets and DoSM statistics

It is also an era of a generation when  70% of lower-income households  cannot even meet monthly basic needs – indeed, more than 60% of these households reported having no savings at all – not much of a difference than 10 years ago:

According to the Employees Provident Fund, over two million contributors aged between 40 and 54 have less than RM10,000 in their retirement savings accounts; and

where increasingly these household expenditures are expansively spent on food:

Thus, the nation of Malaysia is still encasted in acutely absolute income inequality as ever:

As an instance, Bantuan Tunai Rahmah, the cash aid scheme, reportedly has 8.7 million recipients – a quarter of the population – which gives a damning statement on the extent of low incomes among our workers.

Indeed, an UNHDP Report shows that the richest 10% in Malaysia control 38.4% of the economic income as compared to the poorest 10% who control only 1.7%.


Related Readings

Capitalism in Crisis

Financialisation of the Capitalist System

Unequal Exchange under Neo-Imperialism

Financialisation capitalism deepening neoimperialism penetration

Financial imperialism – the globalisation of monopoly-finance capital

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From Colonial Capitalism to Ethnocapital Colonialism

15/02/24

1] INTRODUCTION

In his chapter on “The Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist” in the first volume of Capital, Karl Marx placed special emphasis on the notion of colonialism proper — that is, settler colonialism (from the Latin  colonus, meaning settler). In his words, “The treatment of the indigenous population [of the Americas] was…most frightful in plantation-colonies set up exclusively for the export trade.…“.

The actual situation is that large-scale plantations supplied consumption commodities such as coffee, sugar, cotton, and tea – and the rubber latex tapped as rolls of  caoutchouc  and balls of rubber – known as “niggerheads” from their alleged resemblance to the skulls of black people – arrived in Europe aboard returning slave ships where England had a 33 percent total share of the slave-trading in the Caribbean West Indies and North America in 1673 and 74 percent by 1683; indeed, the Royal African Company, under the ruling arms of the British Crown, owned and controlled 90 percent of the African-slave share by 1690. The transatlantic slave trade allowed for both elimination of Indigenous peoples and the insertion of a racialized Black body marked as slave labour.

From the explicit exploitation of the dark and brown proletariats comes the Surplus Value filched from human beasts’ hearts and souls, Du Bois intoned: Black Reconstruction in America 1860–1880 (1935; repr. New York: Free Press, 1992), 15–16).

Marxist feminists like Claudia Jones in the 1940s and many others today argue that Black women face a triple or interlocking oppression when neither the induction to work nor the surplus value created by all workers is the same because capitalist exploitation is more intensive and brutal for workers of colour. Through the structural and historical framework of racial capitalism, it is determined that capital accumulation depends on this global racialised division of labour and who would eventually be disproportionately impacted, (Claudia Jones, An End to the Neglect of the Problems of the Negro Woman! (New York: National Women’s Commission CPUSA, 1949; read the other works of FEMALE black Marxist writers; Jean Alt Belkhir).

2] COLONIAL CAPITALISM

A few hundred years ago, colonial capital ploughing through our pristine forests opened up settlement plantations and mineral mines had brought about rubber latex and tin ores for new product consumption in the western hemisphere what is commonly referred to as the Global North. Under this imperial process, indenture labour and labour slavery were introduced to peninsula Malaya, Sarawak and British North Borneo:

The plantation system was based on the superexploitation of labour. Pay was so low that the English assistant Leopold Ainsworth wondered how the Tamil workers and their families could “possibly exist as ordinary human beings” on the wages paid on his boss’s Malayan plantation. In 1926, the cost of a Papuan indentured laborer was 20 percent of that of a white worker, 25 percent of that of an employed estate manager, and 10 percent of that of a white unskilled laborer. Racist humiliation, insult, and cruelty were part of the everyday lives of the coolies ( a humiliating term given to the local inhabitants ), while the pale-skin estate owner sipped at stengahs (whisky and sodas) clad in sweatstained khakis, summoning a “boy” with a teapot or gin bottle to the veranda at the end of another hot and humid day with the topee on his head.

It was during a time in the 15th century that the Roman Catholic Church divided the world in half, granting Portugal a monopoly on trade in West Africa and Spain the right to colonize the New World in its quest for land and gold. Pope Nicholas V buoyed Portuguese efforts and issued the Romanus Pontifex of 1455, which affirmed Portugal’s exclusive rights to territories it claimed along the West African coast and the trade from those areas. It granted the right to invade, plunder and “reduce their persons to perpetual slavery.” Queen Isabella invested in Christopher Columbus’s exploration to increase her wealth and ultimately rejected the enslavement of Native Americans, claiming that they were Spanish subjects.

Spain established an asiento, or contract, that authorized the direct shipment of captive Africans for trade as human commodities in the Spanish colonies in the Americas.

When the Spanish conquistadors reached the shores of The Philippines in 1521, the people of Mactan, led by Lapu-Lapu, resisted. Magellan burnt down their villages after they resisted demands for tribute as well as accepting his god and king.

Eventually other European nation-states — the Netherlands, France, Denmark and England — seeking similar economic and geopolitical power joined in the trade, exchanging goods and people with leaders along the West African coast, who ran self-sustaining societies known for their mineral-rich land and wealth in gold and other trade goods. They competed to secure the asiento and colonize the New World. With these efforts, a new form of slavery came into being. It was endorsed by the European nation-states and based on race, and it resulted in the largest forced migration in the world: Some 12.5 million men, women and children of African descent were forced into the trans-Atlantic slave trade.

The sale of their bodies and the product of their labor brought the Atlantic world into being, including colonial North America. In the colonies, status began to be defined by race and class, and whether by custom, case law or statute, freedom was limited to maintain the enterprise of slavery and ensure power.

Even presently, as an instance, thirty percent or more of Congolese cobalt mining is “artisanal”. By sourcing copper in an artisan manner (ASM), it is no more than miners using rudimentary tools and work in a most hazardous condition to extract dozens of minerals andll South. Because ASM is almost entirely informal, artisanal miners rarely have formal agreements for wages and working conditions. There are usually no avenues to seek assistance for injuries or redress for abuse. Artisanal miners are almost always paid paltry wages on a piece-rate basis and must assume all risks of injury, illness, or death,(review Cobalt Red).

This extraction – and exploitative – process is no more any different from the Great Powers colonialism era on their forward movements to exploit raw resources in Africa, Asia and south America where in the latter continent between 1849 and 1874, over 90,000 Chinese workers were contracted to be shipped to Peru. Around 10 percent of those transported died during the voyage across the Pacific. Besides working on plantations or railroads, the most unfortunates were sent to work in the guano pits, where they were forbidden to leave the islands. The total workforce fluctuated between 200 and 800 Chinese workers; new workers simply replaced those who died, given the extensive coolie labour system, (Michael J. Gonzales, “Chinese Plantation Workers and Social Conflict in Peru in the Late Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Latin American Studies 21, 1955: 385–424).

It involved grueling physical labour by males, using picks and shovels to extract the guano from the mountainous deposits, loading wheelbarrows and sacks, and transporting the manure to chutes for loading boats. Each worker was expected to load five tons of guano each day. Behavioral infractions and failure to meet daily quotas were met with physical punishment. The work was exhausting; the stench was overwhelming; and guano dust coated everything, penetrating the eyes, noses, and mouths of the workers. Opium was imported in an attempt to prevent further revolt and suicides among the workers, (see  Lawrence A. Clayton, “Chinese Indentured Labor in Peru,”   History Today  30, no. 6, 1980: 19–23); Alanson Nash and contemporary witnesses reflecting on these conditions, elaborated, “once on the islands a Chinaman seldom gets off, but remains a slave, to die there…….They were seen as expendable beasts, forced to “live and feed like dogs.”

An account, in the Christian Review  noted that “the subtle dust and pungent odor of the new-found fertilizer were not favorable to inordinate longevity.” Guano labour involved “the infernal art of using up human life to the very last inch,” in Chinese Coolie TradeChristian Review, April 1862;  The Chinese Coolie Trade, 1862see also Basil Lubbock,  Coolie Ships and Oil Sailers, Glasgow: Brown, Son and Ferguson, 1955, 35; Charles Wingfield,   The China Coolie Traffic from Macao to Peru and Cuba, London: British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, 1873.

Even after slavery was abolished, millions of people in the Global South still fell victim to the continuing worst of the “free” marketplace. Even after the Second World War, when decolonization led to the end of the so-called “Golden Age of Capitalism,” new liberal economics’ adventurers returned boldly to rob again the wealth of Global South during an era known as neo-colonialism.

3] NEO-COLONIALISM

Michael Morgan in his contribution in Malaya: The Making of a Neo-Colony – (edited by Malcolm Caldwell and Mohamed Amin is a collection of articles with a socialist analysis of Malayan History from 1874 to independence) – pointed out Malayan rubber alone in 1947 earned for Britain US$200 million in comparison to US$180 million earned by all its manufactured exports.

To get some perspective on the magnitude of the US$200 million in 1947 which the British earned from the sale of Malayan rubber to the US, it would be more than 2 billion dollars (US$2,337,051,162) in today’s value, or more than 9 and a half billion ringgits (RM$9,544,012,524).

Bearing in mind the total national expenditure budget in the 2000s was averaging RM$42 billion, you get a sense of the scale of exploitation. That was in that one year alone and only for the one product.

By 1951, the rubber export from Malaya to the United States was estimated to be 370,000 tons valued at US$405,000,000. Britain’s total manufactured exports to the US in that year earned US$400,000,000 – again less than its earnings from Malayan rubber. (Natural Rubber News, January 1952, p 1, cited in Li Dun JenBritish Malaya. An Economic Analysis, InstitutAnalisa Sosial., Kuala Lumpur, 1982).

In today’s value we would be looking at such a figure as US$3,913,000,000 or over RM$18 billion.

Indeed, The Annual Report of the Federation of Malaya for 1948 reported “…of the world’s total output of rubber and tin in 1948 this country produced 45.8 per cent of the former and 28.1 per cent of the latter. This achievement afforded more assistance to the UK and Commonwealth in terms of gold and dollars earned than was afforded to the UK and Commonwealth in terms of gold and dollars earned by the total export drive of Great Britain over the same period.

By way of a fact, in the 1949 annual report of the Lenadoon Rubber Estates, Sir Eric Macfadyen observed: “…rubber is of more importance to the British economy than Marshall Aid. Last year Malaya alone produced just about 700,000 tons. The USA imported from the country over 450,000 tons…Every penny in the price per pound up or down means about US$17 million in our balance of trade.

What is often neglected to mention – until Gordon and Jomo set to dissect archived colonial records – is that besides the raw materials extraction were taxes levied, land and mining concessions gained, opium sales, and dividends paid that were administered by the British raj who as a regime of expatriates having
its control over the colonial state that metropolitan capitalism is able to control, subordinate and exploit the colony society which
served as a channel for surplus appropriation or wealth draining, (Chandra 1980: 278).

Indeed, Utsa Patnaik has calculated the British Raj siphoned out at least
£9.2 trillion, or US$44.6 trillion from India, whereas the UK’s GNP before the pandemic and ‘Brexit’ was a mere US$3 trillion. The estimated colonial contributions to the UK’s dollar pool were at US$2,115 million for 1946-52; thus, Malaya alone contributed US$1,475 million, or 70 per cent of British domestic budgetary, (Gordon and Jomo, ibid.)

That nugget of neoliberal policy paradigm, however, favours expanding the scope of markets – including global markets – by restricting the role of government action that failed. It widened inequality in and within nations, avoid promoting the climate transition, and in fact neglecting a range of global issues from public health, education, social welfare to supply-chain resilience, (so expressed by Dani Rodrik of Harvard).

4] ETHNOCAPITAL COLONIALISM

Even after post-independence, emerging clientel ethnocapitalism replaced colonial racial capitalism by enforcing drastic bad union-bursting labour measures on the working rakyat2, in an imputation of neo-colonialism; see also,  Bhopal, University of North London; and STORM’s  Rentier Capitalism in Accumulation, 2021).

By ethnocapital we mean a (malay) bumiputra owned and controlled an entity performing under a rentier or clientel capitalism approach whether it is a public agency, a government-linked company (GLC) or a privatised and or commercial enterprise.

On this exploratory enquiry we are to delve on the power or dominance relations among persons, their subsumed class to entitled positions that enforce political power which defines economic dominance and social status deference.

Between the dominating and the dominated, under capitalism the capitalists
are dominant at each level, the proletarians are dominated at each.

5] CAPITAL AND CLASS

Neoclassical theory premises on individual preferences, resource endowments and technological capability, while Marxian theory begins with class and class processes.

Nicos Poulantzas conceives a concept of class “places” as distinguished from class positions where “places” exist at each of the these levels of society: economic, political, and ideological (or cultural) levels where at the latter, social dominance regards bumiputeras status and on an islamic allegiance, for instance.

The issues relating to where the economic power emits from could be identified from the stronghold of clientelism and the ensuring political clientel relationship where ruling elites in the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) [place] had aligned with economic oligarchs [positions] in accepting rentier capitalism to sustain their hold on [power]. They adopt this clientelism as solicitations for votes at the grassroots level, allowing ruling elites [place] the party patronage [position] and political [power] to “effectively partisanizing them and ensuring ground-level officials with whom most voters interacted with ……are political party loyalists” (Weiss, 2020), resulting in the skewed distribution of profits by political stakeholders and the stark inequality of wealth permeating in the country (Khalid):

Bumiputera in the top income groups (the top 1 per cent and the 10 per cent) benefited the most from economic development and its ensuing growth

There is every reason to say that patronage position is never moved from place prescence of ruling elite and the political power that oozes. Indeed, ruling elites are the biggest “owners” of divisional-level of UMNO constituency places with the office-bearing posts that defined political positioning posts with the ensuing power distributing spoils that emit therefrom. This is similar to what in management term that owners and managers if are taken as a whole, are elements of the same class. Their differences on this issue are of degree and not of kind. The ownership of the place loci, by situating in a position, the control of vested power elements is explicit.

The two class processes of capitalism are defined as the extraction and distribution of surplus labour in the form of value. The class positions of the capitalist fundamental class processes are productive workers (performers) and productive capitalists (extractors). Capitalists appropriate surplus value from the consumption of labour power during the production of commodities. The surplus is distributed among occupants of subsumed class positions associated with say the state, merchants, financiers, landlords, managers  and monopolies. Therefore, class position is determined by the relationship of the individual to the appropriation and distribution of surplus value.

That positioning presupposes a “place” is already in place or existence – as a political party or as an enterprise entity.

It needs to be emphasised that financial control is merely the outcome of the process of capitalist reproduction. On the one hand, the gradual concentration and centralization of capital forces corporations to rely, over time, on the large pools of capital made available by financial institutions. On the other, the ups and downs of the business cycle force the corporation to rely on external capital at critical conjectures in its development.

Thereby, the value of the state of a nation lies on political stability, a performing economic outlook and achievable results with due inflow of economic developmental funds both domestic and foreign investments, a pulsating economy sustainable within competitive market conditions while reducing wastage and eradicting odious practices so as in generating confidence all-around when rakyat² are happy, educated and knowledge-imbued in excelling productivity towards the common goodness – and betterment – of the country in the sharing of a common wealth.


Related Readings

Colonial Capitalism and clientel ethnocapitalism

Imperialism, Globalisation and its Discontents

Unequal exchange under Neo-Imperialism

Continuance of neo-colonialism

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