Oligarchy and Ethnocracy in Malaysia

Oligarchy in Malaysia consists of wealthy individuals and unmeritorious groups with political influence and/or economic power who construct public policies primarily to benefit themselves financially whether through direct subsidies to their agricultural estates (for examples, FGVH and Rimbunan Hijau) or business firms (YTL, NAZA, the Petra Group and Ananda Krishnan conglomerates), lucrative government contracts (UEM-Sunrise, Gamuda), and protectionist measures (as Sapura-Kencana in the oil and gas sector) while displaying no concern for the marginalized Malaysian.

An ethnocracy is a form of government where representatives of a particular ethnic group holding a disproportionately large number of governing posts to advance their ethnic group to the disfranchisement of others, (see Winter, J.A., Oligarchy, Cambridge University Press, 2011 and Wade, G. (2009).

The emerging stratification of wealth – more so after the introduction of NEP, consolidated through NEM, and now re-enforced with BEEP – has a congregation of players who are empowered by tremendous riches which they employ, and deploy rather ruthlessly, in collusion with political ethnocrats who are powerful not because of wealth, but because of their positions (offices or status) thereby deepening and intensifying the contradictions within society. [1]

The consequential effect of oligarchy dominance can be seen from the Forbes magazine 2010 ‘40 Riches ‘ reports on various Asian countries:


Analyzing the given data, firstly, the 40 richest Malaysians are much wealthy on average (at US$1.28 billion – more than their Singaporean or Thai counterparts). Secondly, the intensity of oligarchic concentration is extreme. The last column calculates a Wealth Concentration Index by adjusting the total wealth of country’s 40 richest oligarchs (in column two) relative to per capita GDP. In a way, this Wealth Concentration Index is far more sensitive to the gap between the richest layer of oligarchs within the top one per cent and the average Malaysian – showing the wide disparity as compared to say Singapore. Thirdly, the Malaysia’s oligarchs have the largest single fortune with a total wealth as % of GDP among the four countries compared (+US$23 billion in column three).

An ethnocratic regime working in hand with incorporated oligarchs to strengthen public control towards the benefit of defined ethnic-centric political interests can be traced since arising consciousness from the Malayan Union to the June 1965 and September 1968 Kongress Ekonomi Bumiputera culminating with the introduction of the 1970’s National Economics Policy (NEP), the reformulated 2010’s New Economics Model (NEM) and the 14th. September 2013 promulgation of the Bumiputera Economic Empowerment Plan (BEEP) that would only likely deepen the ethnocratic thrust and widen the oligarchy spread over the Malaysian society. [2]

The history of Malaysia from aristocracy and tributary feudalism at the time of the Sultanate to mercantilist mode of production and connective comprador during colonial era, and eventual crony capitalism in the 1970s, whereby the Malaysian people working to produce the goods and services have yet to share equally the benefits of their labor while the ruling class continues to own the means of production.

By crony capitalism we mean the close relationships between businesses and political power-holders where any enterprise success is dependent upon favoritism by the ruling state in the form of tax breaks (like the Independent Power Producers: Genting Sanyen, Ananda’s Powertek, and where more than ‘70% of YTL Corporation’s profit come from the power plants’), governement grants (to MMC Gamuda KVMRT (PDP) Sdn. Bhd. in the Klang Valley Mass Rapid Transit project, and the Kidex Highway to the wife of former Chief Justice/UMNO legal adviser Tun Zaki Azmi) and other favourable incentives like the property gain tax so that the RM40bn spent on the Battersea Power Station is led by Sime Darby Bhd and the Employees Provident Fund in league with the SP Setia Sdn. Bhd. oligarch. According to Tax Justice Network, RM893bn was siphoned into tax havens abroad during 1970-2010 – a sum more than triple that of Malaysia’s national debt total of RM257bn in 2011.

Capitalism in Malaysia has reproduced itself – regenerated since the 2010’s NEM – as an ethnocratic oligarchy intending to keep the exploited working class from rising up and overthrowing a system designed to exploit and alienate them through institutional processes via racial differentiation, religious definition, the controlled legal system, and a manipulative civil administration, an inequality access in the educational system all working hand in hand with unjust laws that assume the brutality of totalitarianism.

The foundation of an ethnocratic regime began in the 1950s with the introduction of the Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) by Sir Henry Gurney, and the subsequent formation of the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) at the introductory First Five-Year Malaya Plan, 1956-1960. Tenders and contracts for the rural development projects were won by UMNO politicians and subcontracted to Chinese capitalists. The rise of the Orang Kayu Baru (through “jadi ahli politik untuk buat duit”) saw the rise of the new Malay rich elite who would, through the succeeding years, transformed into the crony capitalism during Mahathir’s governance in allegiance with the ethnocratic ethics presently.[3]

With “developmental economics” in the forefront, an outdated feudal system was in conflict with the new economic system that promises some elements of equality for the disenfranchised agricultural peasantry and the marginalized Malaysian working class. On one hand, those who are marginalized are beginning to be more aware of the ways in which an ideology supports the dominant class in the society. On the other hand, those who enjoy the fruits of belonging to a dominant group of the society are filled with false consciousness uncaring the ways in which an economic foundation marginalizes others, and the continuation to buy into an ideology that supports a structure which eventually cause the emergence, and the rise and stronghold, of an ethnocratic regime that dominated legally, culturally and enterprise-wise widely over a broad segment of the Malaysian people.

Many young Malay women, disinherited from the rural hinterlands to the urban-based multinational corporations factories producing for the world markets, without the protection nor state-sponsorship compared to the “Melayu Baru” that generously received. They lived in poor housing conditions at frimges of the cities in Ulu Kelang, Bayan Lepas, Kulaijaya searching for the privilege of buying a two-room government low-cost flats while the ethnocractic elites spend billions to cater the whims of the emerging bourgeoisie in Shah Alam, PutraJaya and Iskandar Nusajaya. The Mahathir regime refusal to recognize that the shift from the agricultural to the manufacture economic superstructure was done at the backs of the working class, favoring the rich corporate players and the new Malaysian bourgeoisie.

The restructuring of the Malaysian society had, by the 1980s, an ethnicity-oriented policy of “Malay-first” but favoring a cluster of emerging Malay business corporate groups with such cohorts like the AMBD headed by Tan Sri Azman Hashim, Sapura – Tan Sri Shamusuddin Abdul Kadir heading it, the Antah group (Tuanku Naquiyuddin and Tunku Imran of Negeri Sembilan royal family), the Melewar group (Tunku Abdullah and Tunku Iskandar also of the Negeri Sembilan royal family). By the 1990s, the Mofaz family of Mohamed Fauzy and Abdul Hamid, the DRB headed by the late Tan Sri Yahaya Ahmad and family members, and the Taiping consortium led by Dato’ Suleiman Manan. In the 21st. century, we see the emergence of Tan Sri Syed Mokhtar Al-Bukhary controlling BERNAS and PERNAS, and the late Tan Sri SM Nasimuddin SM Amin of the NAZA group, besides the Perak royalty with Gamuda’s interests. One should also not leave aside the emerging cast played by the Malay Economic Action Council (MTEM) in expanding the entrenched ethnocratic caste of empowering, and supporting actively, those BEEP’s tasks ahead.

With an inevitable political progress, and the ensuing economic structural foundation, that evolved from feudalism to bourgeois capitalism leading to crony capitalism and “ethnocratic entrepreneurship”, the privileged oligarchy relies on the proletariat – the labor force responsible for their sustainability and survival, especially when profits are not reinvested in the workers but in creating more factories or plantations, and increasingly, buying luxurious mansions and bungalows in Perth, Melbourne, London, Vancouver and Dubai. As a consequence, the workers are not growing any richer, but poorer and poorer, and the marginalized Malaysian enlargement expands. It is often stated that 23% of the Malay equity is owned by Goverment-linked Corporations, the Malay elite, and the privileged monied class; though the holding by the GLCs could be higher as exposed by Dr Lim Teck Ghee on the fiddling of corporate equity statistics.

To compound an already fractured economy, Government-linked corporations are expanding state involvements in other new areas often in collusion with oligarchies, for example, Permodalah Nasional Berhad (PNB) taking a controlling state in SP Setia Bhd and the state-controlled Sime Darby becoming the largest shareholder in E&O. Though GLCs play an extensive role in Malaysia’s economy, taking up 56% of banking assets, 67% of the communication sector and 88% of utilities acording to an Asian Development Bank report, Malaysian stakeholders do not receive any benefit, but compounding loan interests repayable and the frequent higher utility costs.

The GLCs are defined as companies with commercial goals but with government control over decisions. Some of the invasive entities include Malaysia’s two biggest banks, CIMB (whose CEO is the younger brother of present Prime Minsiter) and Maybank. In fact, 7 out of the 19 listed companies are majority-owned by he government, and thus the GLCs makes up about 36% of the stock market capitalisation in the country. With so much at stake, there is little in terms of return to ordinary people in the country, but as stakeholders have even rugi because thenational wealth had been bailing out those crony capitalists from Bank Bumiputera to Malaysia Airlines and Mahathir’s son Mirzan’s Konsortium Perkapalan Berhad since.

We shall illustrate one corporatized enterprise in peninsular Malaysia to expose the exploitativeness of the capitalist system and the injustice inflicted to the working class.

The corporatization of FELDA into Felda Global Venture Holding sees the unfairness of the sweat and toils of the peasantry cultivators so much so that 351 settlers had taken legal proceedings alleging FELDA had defrauded them over the sales of oil palm. Meanwhile, the Employees’ Provident Fund and Kumpulan Wang Persaraan – FGVH’s substantial shareholders, the former raising its stake to 6.9% on 28th. June 2012 (remember that RM6bn was “borrowed” from the EPF’s rakyat fund to initially float FGV). For the quarter ended 31st. march 2013, FGVH posted a profit before tax of RM208m (7.8%) on the back of turnover of over RM2.7bn compared to RM281m (16.3%) on the back of turnover of RM1.7bn in the corresponding quarter of the previous year. All the toils of the peasantry settlers have been lost. [4]

The ethnocratic corporatism of the ruling oligarchy, not satisfied with deceiving the ordinary Malaysian, had now even entered into the property and the IT markets. In August 2013 it bought the 198-unit Grand Plaza Serviced Apartments at STG98 million (around RM500m. then) under its (FIC) UK Properties unit, besides the Grand Borneo Hotel in Kota Kinablau bringing the number of properties to eight under Felda Invesment Corporation; and the RM110m. deal to gain 25% control of Bursa Malaysia-listed Iris Corp at a 40% premium – thus, all these transactions befitting the exclusive entrepreneurs at the expense of the settlers’ peasantry.

Indeed, one has to ask what FELDA knows about smart cards when it diverges from its core business just like another oligarchic entity Sime Darby tried to go into banking, and then lost billions. For every business and economic project undertaken by the oligarchy is a means by which a small group enriches itself at the expense of the ordinary Malaysian majority: bread for the political aristocrats and crumbs for the masses. It is an oligarchic complicity in suckering the Felda peasantry through plundering FELDA, a wilful conspiracy to cheat and steal from the Felda settlers.

In the wake of the plantations’ mega merger of Kumpulan Guthrie, Golden Hope and Sime Darby, this is the continual greed of an oligarchy regime. The “Dawn Raid” by the Permodalan Nasional Berhad corporate takeover of Guthrie in 7th. September 1981 – often regarded as a decolonization process then – was more than a mere demonstration in economic nationalism or the posturing of national sovereignty, but the beginning of a determined oligarchy enterprise that is ethnocratic-focused, supplanting any decent equal sharing of wealth among the belabored Malaysian.[5]

Another entity is the national oil company, Petroliam Nasional or Petronas founded in 1974 (initially it was proposed as HIKMA for Hidrokarbon Malaysia), with the first production sharing scheme signed with Shell in 1976 where the initial contracts call for a maximum cost recovery of 20% (25% for gas), and the government received a 10% royalty; the remaining 70% was split with 70% going to Petronas and 30% to the foreign oil companies, with a contract extending for 20 years. There was initially a steep management learning curve because in 1970 there were only 5 Malays studying engineers in the University of Malaya. Presently, the non-bumi staff employment is about 2%; Indian expatriates, and other South-east Asian staff, are contracted instead.

This national corporation has been involving in many non-energy projects requested by the Prime Minister, and these include investments in (the demised) Bank Bumiputra, MISC, the Twin Tower, Putrajaya, and even the Petronas Orkestra. [6]

Thus, it is not surprising that the distribution of the wealth of Petronas under the 1974 Petroleum Development Act which granted royalties to the petroleum-producing states of Trengganu, Sabah and Sarawak was used as political leverage to subjugate opposition state governments (as in Trengganu 2001) – to deprive accumulated wealth supposedly shared by the people. Only 5% of the profit from what Petronas extracts is allowed to remain in the State with the rest siphoned off to the federal Government. Also, with production sharing scheme enforced, the partner states of Sabah and Sarawak do not have the beneficial royalty re-channel to their respective state economic development so much so that 50 years after Independence, there is no adequate electricity or water supplies to villages outside the major towns. Instead of providing fuel in powering up electricity plants, Petronas has encouraged Sarawak in furtherance deforesting of its virgin land to build hydroelectric dam projects, thus grossly degrading the environment and disregarding the indigenous peoples like displacing families within the Burum dam reservoir in Belaga, whilst forgoing SUHAKAM urge to safeguard the rights of the state’s most vulnerable citizens. For many Penan children, the nearest school is at least two hours by foot.

In Sarawak, The World Rainforest Movement has declared that the long-term deforestation effect is not only in threatening life, but the negative impact upon the social and economic well-being of societies in the name of development. Having stripped Sarawak forestry bare, it now seems that Sarawak Taib’s timber tycoons are moving in on its oil reserves. The Rimbunan Hijau group is expected to inject more oil field assets into their subsidiary Rimbunan HijauPetrogas, even granted licenses to extract from the shallow waters off Sarawak. [7]

The capitalist head of the Rimbunan Hijau is Tiong Hew King who is now in the forefront of obtaining oil palm concessionaires from the Chief Minister. Recently, it was announced that the Sarawak Mosque Welfare Trust (Lembaga), a major oil plam plantation owner, has transferred its assets to this Tiong; the chairman of Lembaga is none other than the Chief Minister, Abdul Taib Mahmud who has been ruling Sarawak over 31 years, patrolling the state’s control with a fleet of 14 helicopters.

Through the UBG Bank (formerly Bank Utama) – owned by the ethnocratic family of Taib CMS – son Abu Bekir is the chairman, with son-in-law Syed Ahmen Alwee Asree supporting him – it controlled till 2007 60% of Malaysia’s fourth largest bank, RHB. The ethnocratic regime in the federal government through the EPF paid UBG RM1.4bn in cash for that share in RHB. Thus, working people pension funds are drawn off into Taib’s own bank accounts just by these participative ruling oligarchs.

With an ethnocratic regime closely enmeshed in an old boys’ network, the Sarawak State Secretary, Y.B. Datuk Amar Haji Mohamad Morshidi Abdul Ghani is on the board of the Employees’ Provident Fund. The EPF once rescued the Bakun Dam, siphoning RM5.75bn of workers’ contributions on this white (concrete) elephant.

Cahaya Mata Sarawak (jokingly stands for Chief Minister’s Sons), Naim Cendera Holdings and Titanium Management Bhd belong to the Chief Minister’s family; all major contracts and a significant portion of land suitable for palm oil plantations are given priority to these companies.

A confidential cable to the State Department dated 13th. October 2006, the U.S. Embassy in Malaya was noted to transmit a report that “Taib and his relatives are widely thought to extract a percentage from most major commercial contracts – including those for logging – awarded in the state (Sarawak)”.[8]

Even as early as 2007, Malaysia has a higher Gini coefficient than Indonesia: 49.2 as opposed to 34.2 according to an UN report; the same report also reveals that the richest 10% in Malaysia has an income 22 times that of the poorest 10%. If “historical materialism” is the ultimate driving force, then the distribution of resources, production, and ultimately the fair gain among the deprived Malaysian should be realized, but unfortunately it has not.

This is so because in Sabah – which is the poorest of the Malaysian federal partners – the dominance of the federal ethnocratic rule structure is transferred to the north Borneo state accentuating the contradictions between a ruling class and the disenfranchised partner’s state working population. In a guise to hold on to an ethnocratic political stranglehold, Project IC was initiated to swamp the local constituents whereby “foreigners would become the majority by the year 2020 if the influx of illegal was left unchecked”, (Star 1995).

The population of peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak (2010 Census) already indicates the dire of a situation – 8.2% of 28.3 million already consists of non-citizen – where even a former Prime Minister was quoted to have stated “One day we might lose our country” (Star 1997); this was Mahathir!

The principle of national sovereignty as enshrined in the United Nations system discourages inter-state interference, but in reality an ethnocratic regime fledging its political muscle is holding Sabah in hostage by vested capitalist interest groups in pursuit of exploiting migrant workers and by entrenched political force that in collusion had failed to protect their own citizens. The present nation-building effort is a thinly veiled state project to assimilate minorities, and to dilute nationals with migrants with an ethno-nationalistic aspirations to promote a particular ethnic identity, culture or religion rather than a Malaysian consciousness narrative.

With the country development led by a parasitic civil service hanging on to hand-outs and a dependent, and “collusive”, capitalist class to easy “rent receivables”, this predatory ethnocracy had unfortunately extended socio-economic and political marginalization of less empowered ethnic groups that Kadazandusun and other Orang Asal cultural practices are rendered illegitimate. Hence, the mode of a Malaysian inclusiveness – not exclusive ethnocracy – has to be reclaimed immediately, now.[9]


With the publication of Malaysia@50 – Economic Development, Distribution, Disparities (Jomo,K.S. & Wee, C.H., 2013) documented are oligarchies and their everlasting ethnocratic-relationships that clearly demonstrated perversions that have been sustained, and shall continue:

“……..have facilitated significant private capture of rents by the politically well connected, presumably with some sharing of the rents captured with those in a position to allocate them as well as others whose support is necessary to retain positions of political privilege’, (page 176).

1] “the growing dominance of UMNO in the ruling coalition has meant that inter-ethnic redistribution, particularly to benefit politically connected business interests…..is the regime’s electoral longevity (relying) on the advantages of long-term incumbency, superior financial resources, a virtual media monopoly as well as an effectively controlled electoral system….”, (page 61) illustrating the sprawl of ethnocratic clutch to maintaining, and even perpetualing, power.

2] “The aggregate performance of the SOE…. (the state-owned enterprises, known as GLCs in our study) …has been overwhelmingly determined by the performance of PETRONAS and its subsidiaries…whereby the SOE sector had very high levels of development expenditure”, (page 40); (see also Jomo.K (ed.) (1995), Privatizing Malaysia: Rents, Rhetoric, Realities, Westview Press), reconfirming our stand on the GLCs’ inadequate performance and “moral hazard” practices.

3] “…..however privatization was not accompanies by significantly increased competition. For example, MAS, Pos Malaysia Berhad, Tenanaga Nasional Berhad, Telekom Malaysia, and MISC remained virtual monopolies”, (page 131) supporting our exertion the intimate connection between an ethnocratic regime and the oligarchies.

4] “But this opportunity ….(on the 1 September 1998 introduction of currency and capital controls; the next day, Anwar was arrested, and Reformasi began)…… was abused, not only to bail out selected companies, but also certain well-connected individuals….thus complemented the privatization policy to advance or protect crony business interests”, (pages 133-134); (see also Johnson, S. and Mitton,T., (2001), “Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from Malaysia”, NBER).

5] “Sabah and Sarawak have contributed significantly to Malaysia’s favourable trade balance….(through) petroleum, timber and agricultural resources….(but) the growth of inter-regional trade has been unfavourable to Sabah and Sarawak”, (pages 161-162 and 167), thus reaffirming our commitment that a national consciousness on Malaysian inclusiveness must be proclaimed, and reclaimed, by our partner states.

Unfortunately, this research study by the Strategic Information and Research Development Centre in Petaling Jaya, only covered the period of developmental efforts and disparity distributions up to late October 2012 (according to the latest cited references), though there were a few scattered paragraphs on the GE13 (pages 64, 137 and 145). Otherwise, it is an easy-to-read digest of developmental conditions, and the analyzed situations, in the past 5 decades with supportive tables and figures for any concerned critique to breeze along without any possibly of a monsoons’ storm.



Balasubramaniam, R., “The Ethnocratic Dilemma and the Malaysian Social Contract”, and the “Culture of Domination” in Jurist Malaya Initiative, 2013; http://juristmalaya.com/

iCapital, “Evaluation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) – Why was the NEP Implemented?”, undated manuscript.

Datuk Mohd. Ariff Sabri Abdul Aziz, “Beep beep here comes the roadrunner!”, Sakmongkol.blogspot.com, September 25th, 2013.

Jomo, K.S., “Malaysia’s New Economic Policy and National Unity”, Third World Quarterly, Vol.11, No:4, pp36-53.

Chakravarty, S. and Roslan,A., “Ethnic Nationalism and Income Distribution in Malaysia”, The European Journal of Development Research, Vol.17, No.2, June 2005, pp.270-288.

see also Josh Hong article on “Israel and Malaysia: Ethnocracies par excellence” in:


[2] Ishak, M.M., “Managing Ethnicity and Constructing the ‘Bangsa Malaysia’, Malaysia Management Journal 6, (1 & 2), pp99-115, 2002; see also Wade, G. (2009) and Balasubramaniam, R.,[footnote 1 and the General References listing below] and his “What is the future of Democracy in Malaysia?”, in the Jurist Malaya Initiative website, besidesSamuel, M. & Tee, M.Y. (2013) Malaysia: Ethnocracy and Education. In L. Symaco, Education in South-East Asia. Bloomsbury Publishing).


Gomez, T.E. and Jomo, K.S.. Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, Patronage, and Profits, 2nd ed. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1999; see also Mohamed,A. and Caldwell, M., Malaya: the Making of a Neo-Colony, Spokesman Books, 1977; and http://econsmalaysia.blogspot.com/2012/07/illicit-outflows-here-we-go-again.html

Shamsul, A.B., “The economic dimension of Malay nationalism – the socio-historical roots of the New Economic Policy and its contemporay implications”, The Developing Economics, XXXV-3 (September 1997), pp 240-261;see also Jesudason, J.,Ethnicity and the Economy: The State, Chinese Business and Multinationals in Malaysia. Oxford University Press, 1989.

[4] Ariff, M. and Abubakar, S.Y., “Strengthening entrepreneurship in Malaysia”, Malaysian Institute of Economic Research, undated manuscript.

[5] White, N.J. and Yacob,S., “Guthrie’s ‘Dawn Raid’ – a Malaysian Nationalistic Coup?”, 2011;

[6] Mehdren, F. & Troner, A., “Petronas: a National Oil Company with an International Vision”, The James Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 2007; see also Jaringan Orang Asal SeMalaysia, “Study on ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision Making”, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/ExpertMechanism/3rd/docs/contributions/IP_Alliance_Archipelago.pdf

[7] Sarawak Report, various, and The Borneo Project:http://borneoproject.org/photo-gallery/indigenous-resistance

[8] Wikileaks, and The Borneo Project: http://borneoproject.org/updates/wikileaks-us-government-characterizes-taib-as-highly-corrupt;seealso:http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KUALALUMPUR1935_a.htmlfor other coverage on Malaysia.


Mohamad, M., “From Nationalism to Post-Developmentalism: The Intersection of Gender, Race and Religion in Malaysia”, Macalester International Vol. 12; and Wawrinec, C., “Tribality and Indigeneity in Malaysia and Indonesia”, The Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, Winter 2010.

Achin, N., “Orang Asli di Semenanjung Malaysia – Kepentingan dan Cabaran”, Jaringan Kampong Orang Asli Semenanajung Malaysia (JKOASM), 21st. September 2013.

General References:

Acquired through

Balasubramaniam, R., “Ethnocracy and the Culture of Domination”, in Jurist Malaya Initiative, 2013; http://juristmalaya.com/

Wade, G., The Origins and Evolution of Ethnocracy in Malaysia, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, Working Paper Series 112, April 2009.

White, N.J., “The Beginning of Crony Capitalism: Business, Politics and Economic Development in Malaysia”, Modern Asian Studies, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

The Framework:

Adopted from

Ishak, M.M., “From Plural Society to Bangsa Malaysia: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Politics of Nation-Building in Malaysia”, University of Leeds, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, July 1999.

Lee, J.H., “UMNO Factionalism and the Politics of Malaysian National Identity”, Murdoch University, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 2005.

Mandla, B., “BEE and Malaysia’s NEP: A comparative study”, University of Stellenbosch, unpublished Master of Arts (International Studies), December 2006.

The Approaches:

Adapted to

Boon, B., “Malaysia: 50 years of independence (Part I & Part II) – Colonialism at the root of the national question”, 31st. August 2007.

Taffe, P., “Review of Jeyakumar Devaraj’s ‘Malaysia at the Crossroads, a Socialist Perspective’“, 5th. October 2009; http://www.socialistworld.net/mob/doc/4071

Yeoh, T., “Crony capitalism in Malaysia: Breaking the business and political nexus”, in New Mandala, 24th. March 2012; http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2012/03/24/malaysia-after-regime-change-tricia-yeoh/ (last accessed 25th. September, 2013).